How is it 3M, DuPont and others can sit on NFPA and not disclose toxins in equipment knowing if they did it impacts their bottom line?

How is it 3M, DuPont and others can sit on NFPA and not disclose toxins in equipment knowing if they did it impacts their bottom line?

How is it 3M, DuPont and others can sit on NFPA and not disclose toxins in equipment knowing if they did it impacts their bottom line?

This may not make a whole lot of sense to non fire/military people and the acronyms won’t be familiar to non first-responders. But it’s an important look into what we in the fire service take for granted. When we see something is marked ‘meets NFPA standards for …’ (National Fire Protection Agency), we instantly think, “well it has to be safe, it meets NFPA standards!”

NFPA will call themselves a neutral organization. That’s not for me to decide. But they are the body that oversees every aspect of fire protection. From a sprinkler head, to the drag device on PPE. Everything goes through NFPA committees for review, discussion, public comments, first draft, second draft, reports, technical committees, and finally revisions and publication every for years of the fire service bible. It is extremely tedious and tremendous efforts and hours of research are put in by these committees. You’d have to open up the latest edition of NFPA 11 on FOAM to understand the scope of the work these committees are tasked with. The committees are made up of voting and non voting members. Those members include an array of manufacturers, special experts, scientists, firefighters, and NFPA Staff Liason.

Now, I know at this second I’m gonna be taking many hits from people in NFPA that will find this article outrageous. So be it. This is what I, an outsider, a fire-wife whose husband had career ending cancer, sought answers to.

The question I had was, “how can manufactures that know they are using products that contain a known carcinogen sit on these committees without whispering a word to anyone that they have a secret?”

The answer was they have no legal, or moral obligation to.

In the case of 3M., they began sitting on NFPA 11, the committee for AFFF or aqueous film forming foam, as far back as 1972. They may have been there longer but those records are archived. Along with 3M, was the Navy.

If 3M knew in 1972 that their AFFF was toxic, they said nothing to NFPA about it. And if the military knew, they too said nothing in those years.

So what’s the big deal about NFPA?

Because, every purchase order for AFFF for the military, or for most/all municipal and rural fire houses, all 58,000 of them, are stating their AFFF must ‘meet NFPA standard for FOAM’’.

By 3M and others hiding in NFPA, they literally shape the outcome of their company. They understand that by having their product meet NFPA standards for AFFF, for their military spec AFFF, they have a golden egg. The AFFF that meets NFPA standards becomes the stamp of approval for every airport and fire station in the nation, and beyond. It’s not just the USA that goes by the NFPA standard. It’s also the standard for many other countries.

And, same with our turnout gear…. DuPont immersed itself in NFPA 1971 for Structural Firefighting PPE. The organization that sets the standard for the flow of purchasing their product on a global platform.

DuPont never once mentioned they had a problem with PFOA. Or that the chemicals used to coat our gear will degrade to form PFOA. Or, that Europe told them they are going to have to remove it by 2020 from turnout gear. They remained silent to the same NFPA committees that determine every aspect of turnout gear. If you’re in the fire service you understand how much our manufacturers are involved in our cancer prevention research, programs, teachings, and symposiums. You also understand that in NFPA, the testing of turnout gear examines everthing from the ‘particle size down to the micron that can permeate the fabrics in PPE’, to the width of reflective tape, to the balance of the helmet. But they never wanted to test the chemical coatings, or for that matter, the chemicals used in the manufacturer of our turnout gear.

They do want to talk a lot about POCs though. Products of combustion.

Manufacturers will not give us the chemical content in PPE information when asked. We were told that information is CBI or ‘confidential business information’.

To that end we have had to fund the testing of turnout gear ourselves. The Last Call Foundation Honoring Firefighter Michael Kennedy has already funded over $20,000.xx to test 20 years worth of ‘new, never-worn’ and some decommissioned gear of the same manufacturer and years.

The problem with all of this, is, we may never know if our cancers were caused from this PFOA. But for those of us who have lost loved ones, lost careers, struggle with insurance, lose insurance, are sued by insurers for getting cancer, fight for legislation only to lose over and over again, it’s a real kick in the teeth to know that while CEO’s knew of their chemicals causing cancers in lab animals, they were securing billions in contracts in the military and beyond. And sitting across the table with us talking about cancer. Watching us bury our dead at the NFFF memorial every year. Sponsored by some of these same manufacturers.

Here’s a look at the last 45 years into NFPA 11 Committee on Foam.

Us Navy Labs present from day 1.

Why is this important? Because there are documents showing the US military knew in the 70’s that AFFF was toxic.

1972 NFPA Foam

https://www.nfpa.org/Assets/files/AboutTheCodes/11/1973_TCR-11-11B.pdf

In 1972 they were printing the entire NFPA codes as one 1500 hundred page

(approx) publication. FOAM is on page 735 to page 777. No discussion on FF safety.

I see no AFFF manufacturers sitting on this NFPA committee for foam yet.

https://www.nfpa.org/assets/files/AboutTheCodes/11/NFPA_TCR_A1972.pdf

1974 Report of the Foam Committee (still no AFFF manufacturers I recognize).

https://www.nfpa.org/Assets/files/AboutTheCodes/11/1974_TCR-11-11B.pdf

In 1975 3M appears:

https://www.nfpa.org/Assets/files/AboutTheCodes/11/TCRA-1975-11.pdf

1976:

https://www.nfpa.org/Assets/files/AboutTheCodes/11/TCRA-1976-11-11A.pdf

(beginning on page 13 of 28 pg pdf): Part II Standard for High Expansion Foam Systems (Expansion Ratios from 100:1 to 1000:1)

11 A-8 J HGH EXPANSION FOAM SYSTEMS

I-7 Personnel Safety. 1–7.1 Hazards to Personnel. Tile discharge of large amounts of high expansion foam may inundate personnel, blocking vision, making hearing difficult, and creating some discomfort in brc,~thing. This breathing discomfort will increase with a reduction in expansion ratio of tile foam and also under the effect of sprinkler discharge.

1–7.1.1 Personnel working in a hazmat area and with no responsibility for fire fighting shall be instructed to immediately vacate the area in the event of fire, if possible. If personnel are unable to vacate and are trapped so that their lives are endangered by smoke or heat, they may enter the foam. Instructions shall be given to move the hand over the nose and mouth to minimize discomfort in breathing within tile foam. I-7.1.2 Where possible the relative location of foam discharge points to building exits shall he arranged to facilitate evacuation of personnel. I-7.1.3 To re-enter a foam-filled building, a coarse water spray may be used to cut a path in the foam. Personnel shall not enter the foam. The foam is opaque, and it is impossible to see when one is submerged. It is dangerous to enter a build- • .,~ ………………….. a …… one ………….. 1–7.1.4 Caution. A canister type gas mask shall not be worn in the foam. The chemicals of the canister will react with the water of the foam and cause suffocation. If emergency reentry is essential, self-contained breathing apparatus shall be used in conjunction with a life line.

1978

3M still there

https://www.nfpa.org/Assets/files/AboutTheCodes/11/TCRA-1978-11.pdf

Still nothing about toxicity unless I’m missing it completely.

1982 3m, Ansul,

https://www.nfpa.org/Assets/files/AboutTheCodes/11/TCRA-1978-11.pdf

Page 2 of 30 in this pdf. There is discussion about favoritism being shown to AFFF and there is discussion about the industry referring to all foam as AFFF which others on the committee are in agreement with.

Chapter 4 ~ 4~ Objective: (a) This Chapter is totally biased in favor~ of AFFF and ignores more than 20 years of successful u,.;e of regular foam and compatible ‘dry chemical and 15 years use of fluoroproteion foam and other dry chemicals. (b) Inclusion of this Chapter as describing “Systems” doesn’t fit the Standard (nor did it really•fit lIB) because combined agent equipment is generally used as portable. “Recommendation: Either delete the Chapter or completely rewrite to include recognition of other effective agent combinations.

Page 3 has a lot of input from 3M.

1987 Report of Committee on Foam

https://www.nfpa.org/Assets/files/AboutTheCodes/11/TCRF-1987-11-11A.pdf

Discussion about AFFF vs AFFP among other things.

1993

https://www.nfpa.org/Assets/files/AboutTheCodes/11/TCRF-1993-11-11A.pdf

2002 https://www.nfpa.org/assets/files/AboutTheCodes/11/11-A2002-rop.pdf

https://www.nfpa.org/codes-and-standards/all-codes-and-standards/list-of-codes-and-standards/detail?code=11&year=2002

This was the year the ‘personal note’ came from one of the committee members that called AFFF a death sentence. That story broke in 2017 and called for Congressman Brian Fitzgerald to ask for a “DoD investigation into who knew what and when did they know it..”

https://www.theintell.com/news/20170609/dangers-of-firefighting-foam-discussed-in-2001-document-shows

2004 This the first reference to environmental safety that I found. It is in the Annex…. If it was in the previous Annex’s I didn’t go looking. There is discussion of ‘environmental issues’.. but nothing to warn the first responder using the equipment of how toxic it is/was. NFPA 11 is not the organization for safety operating instructions. Those are set by the manufacturer. I then asked three colleges who know foam very well, ‘who determines if the foam is safe to use?’ Is that NFPA?

All said no… and that UL is the 3rd party that tests the NFPA standards… but still no answer on how a product is determined safe to use… I have since learned that a product can be brought to NFPA to make sure it meets the NFPA 11 requirements. But there is no organization like FDA that stamps approval on the item. Only if the item were later found hazardous would it be looked at more closely.

page 46 of 52

https://www.nfpa.org/assets/files/AboutTheCodes/11/11-F2004-ROP.pdf

Annex F Foam Environmental Issues This annex is not a part of the requirements of this NFPA document but is included for informational purposes only. F.1 Overview. Fire-fighting foams as addressed in this standard serve a vital role in fire protection throughout the world. Their use has proven to be essential for the control of flammable liquid fire threats inherent in airport operations, fuel farms and petroleum processing, highway and rail transportation, marine applications, and industrial facilities. The ability of foam to rapidly extinguish flammable liquid spill fires has undoubtedly saved lives, reduced property loss, and helped minimize the global pollution that can result from the uncontrolled burning of flammable fuels, solvents, and industrial liquids. However, with the ever increasing environmental awareness, recent concern has focused on the potential adverse environmental impact of foam solution discharges. The primary concerns are fish toxicity, biodegradability, treatability in wastewater treatment plants, and nutrient loading. All of these are of concern when the end-use foam solutions reach natural or domestic water systems. Additionally, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has highlighted a potential problem with some foam concentrates by placing glycol ethers and ethylene glycol, common solvent constituents in some foam concentrates, on the list of hazardous air pollutants under the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. The purpose of this annex is to address the following: (1) Provide foam users with summary information on foam environmental issues (2) Highlight applicable regulatory status (3) Offer guidelines for coping with regulations, and provide suggested sources for additional information (4) Encourage planning for foam discharge scenarios (including prior contact with local wastewater treatment plant operators) It should be emphasized that it is not the intent of this annex to limit or restrict the use of fire-fighting foams. The foam committee believes that the fire safety advantages of using foam are greater than the risks of potential environmental problems. The ultimate goal of this section is to foster use of foam in an environmentally responsible manner so as to minimize risk from its use

F.2 Scope. The information provided in this section covers foams for Class B combustible and flammable liquid fuel fires. Foams for this purpose include protein foam, fluoroprotein foam, film-forming fluoroprotein foam (FFFP), and synthetic foams such as aqueous film-forming foam (AFFF). Some foams contain solvent constituents that can require reporting under federal, state, or local environmental regulations. In general, synthetic foams, such as AFFF, biodegrade more slowly than protein-based foams. Protein-based foams can be more prone to nutrient loading and treatment facility “shock loading” due to their high ammonia nitrogen content and rapid biodegradation, respectively. This section is primarily concerned with the discharge of foam solutions to wastewater treatment facilities and to the environment. The discharge of foam concentrates, while a related subject, is a much less common occurrence. All manufacturers of foam concentrate deal with clean-up and disposal of spilled concentrate in their MSDS sheets and product literature.

F.3 Discharge Scenarios. A discharge of foam water solution is most likely to be the result of one of four scenarios: (1) Manual fire-fighting or fuel-blanketing operations (2) Training (3) Foam equipment system tests (4) Fixed system releases These four scenarios include events occurring at such places as aircraft facilities, fire fighter training facilities, and special hazards facilities (such as flammable/hazardous warehouses, bulk flammable liquid storage facilities, and hazardous waste storage facilities). Each scenario is considered separately in F.3.1 through F.3.4.

F.3.1 Fire-Fighting Operations. Fires occur in many types of locations and under many different circumstances. In some cases it is possible to collect the foam solution used; and in others, such as in marine fire fighting, it is not. These types of incidents would include aircraft rescue and fire-fighting operations, vehicular fires (i.e., cars, boats, train cars), structural fires with hazardous materials, and flammable liquid fires. Foam water solution that has been used in fire-fighting operations will probably be heavily contaminated with the fuel or fuels involved in the fire. It is also likely to have been diluted with water discharged for cooling purposes. In some cases, the foam solution used during fire department operations can be collected. However, it is not always possible to control or contain the foam. This can be a consequence of the location of the incident or the circumstances surrounding it. Event-initiated manual containment measures are the operations usually executed by the responding fire department to contain the flow of foam water solution when conditions and manpower permit. Those operations include the following measures: (1) Blocking sewer drains: this is a common practice used to prevent contaminated foam water solution from entering the sewer system unchecked. It is then diverted to an area suitable for containment. (2) Portable dikes: these are generally used for land-based operations. They can be set up by the fire department personnel during or after extinguishment to collect run-off. (3) Portable booms: these are used for marine-based operations, which are set up to contain foam in a defined area. These generally involve the use of floating booms within a natural body of water

F.3.2 Training. Training is normally conducted under circumstances conducive to the collection of spent foam. Some fire training facilities have had elaborate systems designed and constructed to collect foam solution, separate it from the fuel, treat it, and — in some cases — re-use the treated water. At a minimum, most fire training facilities collect the foam solution for discharge to a wastewater treatment facility. Training can include the use of special training foams or actual fire-fighting foams. Training facility design should include a containment system. The wastewater treatment facility should first be notified and should give permission for the agent to be released at a prescribed rate.

F.3.3 System Tests. Testing primarily involves engineered, fixed foam fireextinguishing systems. Two types of tests are conducted on foam systems: acceptance tests, conducted pursuant to installation of the system; and maintenance tests, usually conducted annually to ensure the operability of the system. These tests can be arranged to pose no hazard to the environment. It is possible to test some systems using water or other nonfoaming, environmentally acceptable liquids in the place of foam concentrates if the authority having jurisdiction permits such substitutions. In the execution of both acceptance and maintenance tests, only a small amount of foam concentrate should be discharged to verify the correct concentration of foam in the foam water solution. Designated foam water test ports can be designed into the piping system so that the discharge of foam water solution can be directed to a controlled location. The controlled location can consist of a portable tank that would be transported to an approved disposal site by a licensed contractor. The remainder of the acceptance test and maintenance test should be conducted using only water.

F.3.4 Fixed System Releases. This type of release is generally uncontrolled, whether the result of a fire incident or a malfunction in the system. The foam solution discharge in this type of scenario can be dealt with by event-initiated operations or by engineered containment systems. Event-initiated operations encompass the same temporary measures that would be taken during fire department operations: portable dikes, floating booms, and so forth. Engineered containment would be based mainly on the location and type of facility, and would consist of holding tanks or areas where the contaminated foam water solution would be collected, treated, and sent to a wastewater treatment facility at a prescribed rate.

F.4 Fixed Systems. Facilities can be divided into those without an engineered containment system and those with an engineered containment system.

F.4.1 Facilities without Engineered Containment. Given the absence of any past requirements to provide containment, many existing facilities simply allow the foam water solution to flow out of the building and evaporate into the atmosphere or percolate into the ground. The choices for containment of foam water solution at such facilities fall into two categories: event-initiated manual containment measures and installation of engineered containment systems. Selection of the appropriate choice is dependent on the location of the facility, the risk to the environment, the risk of an automatic system discharge, the frequency of automatic system discharges, and any applicable rules or regulations. “Event-initiated manual containment measures” will be the most likely course of action for existing facilities without engineered containment systems. This can fall under the responsibility of the responding fire department and include such measures as blocking storm sewers, constructing temporary dikes, and deploying floating booms. The degree of such measures will primarily be dictated by location as well as available resources and manpower.” The “installation of engineered containment systems” is a possible choice for existing facilities. Retrofitting an engineered containment system is costly and can adversely affect facility operations. There are special cases, however, that can warrant the design and installation of such systems. Such action is a consideration where an existing facility is immediately adjacent to a natural body of water and has a high frequency of activation.

F.4.2 Facilities with Engineered Containment. Any engineered containment system will usually incorporate an oil/water separator. During normal drainage conditions (i.e., no foam solution runoff), the separator functions to remove any fuel particles from drainage water. However, when foam water solution is flowing the oil/water separator must be bypassed so that the solution is diverted directly to storage tanks. This can be accomplished automatically by the installation of motorized valves set to open the bypass line upon activation of the fixed fire-extinguishing systems at the protected property. The size of the containment system is dependent on the duration of the foam water flow, the flow rate, and the maximum anticipated rainfall in a 24- hour period. Most new containment systems will probably only accommodate individual buildings. However, some containment systems can be designed to accommodate multiple buildings dependent upon the topography of the land and early identification in the overall site planning process. The specific type of containment system selected will also be dependent upon location, desired capacity, and function of facilities in question. They include earthen retention systems, belowground tanks, open-top inground tanks, and sump and pump designs (i.e., lift stations) piped to aboveground or inground tanks. The earthen retention designs consist of open-top earthen berms, which usually rely upon gravity-fed drainage piping from the protected building. They can simply allow the foam water solution to percolate into the ground or can include an impermeable liner. Those containing an impermeable liner can be connected to a wastewater treatment facility or can be suction pumped out by a licensed contractor. Closed-top, belowground storage tanks can be the least environmentally acceptable design approach. They usually consist of a gravity-fed piping arrangement and can be suction pumped out or piped to a wastewater treatment facility. A potential and often frequent problem associated with this design is the leakage of ground water or unknown liquids into the storage tank. Open-top, belowground storage tanks are generally lined concrete tanks that can rely on gravity-fed drainage piping or a sump and pump arrangement. These can accommodate individual or multiple buildings. They must also accommodate the maximum anticipated rainfall in a 24-hour period. These are usually piped to a wastewater treatment facility. Aboveground tanks incorporate a sump and pump arrangement to closed, aboveground tanks. Such designs usually incorporate the use of one or more submersible or vertical shaft, large capacity pumps. These can accommodate individual or multiple buildings.

F.4.3 New Facilities. The decision to design and install a fixed foam water solution containment system is dependent on the location of the facility, the risk to the environment, possible impairment of facility operations, the design of the fixed foam system (i.e., automatically or manually activated), the ability of the responding fire department to execute event-initiated containment measures, and any pertinent regulations.

AFT New facilities might not warrant the expense and problems associated with containment systems. Where the location of a facility does not endanger ground water or any natural bodies of water, this can be an acceptable choice, provided the fire department has planned emergency manual containment measures. Where conditions warrant the installation of engineered containment systems, there are a number of considerations. They include size of containment, design and type of containment system, and the capability of the containment system to handle individual or multiple buildings. Engineered containment systems can be a recommended protective measure where foam extinguishing systems are installed in facilities that are immediately adjacent to a natural body of water. These systems can also be prudent at new facilities, where site conditions permit, to avoid impairment of facility operations. F.5 Disposal Alternatives. The uncontrolled release of foam solutions to the environment should be avoided. Alternative disposal options are as follows: (1) Discharge to a wastewater treatment plant with or without pretreatment (2) Discharge to the environment after pretreatment (3) Solar evaporation (4) Transportation to a wastewater treatment plant or hazardous waste facility Foam users, as part of their planning process, should make provisions to take the actions necessary to utilize whichever of these alternatives is appropriate for their situation.

Section F.6 describes the actions that can be taken, depending on the disposal alternative that is chosen. F.6 Collection and Pretreatment of Foam Solutions Prior to Disposal. F.6.1 Collection and Containment. The essential first step in employing any of these alternatives is collection of the foam solution. As noted above, facilities that are protected by foam systems normally have systems to collect and hold fuel spills. These systems can also be used to collect and hold foam solution. Training facilities are, in general, designed so that foam solution can be collected and held. Fire fighters responding to fires that are at other locations should attempt, insofar as it is practical, to collect foam solution run-off with temporary dikes or other means. F.6.2 Fuel Separation. Foam solution that has been discharged on a fire and subsequently collected will usually be heavily contaminated with fuel. Since most fuels present their own environmental hazards and will interfere with foam solution pretreatment, an attempt should be made to separate as much fuel as possible from the foam solution. As noted in F.4.2, the tendency of foam solutions to form emulsions with hydrocarbon fuels will interfere with the operation of conventional fuel-water separators. An alternative is to hold the collected foam solution in a pond or lagoon until the emulsion breaks and the fuel can be separated by skimming. This can take from several hours to several days. During this time, agitation should be avoided to prevent the emulsion from reforming. F.6.3 Pretreatment Prior to Discharge. F.6.3.1 Dilution. Foam manufacturers and foam users recommend dilution of foam solution before it enters a wastewater treatment plant. There is a range of opinion on the optimum degree of dilution. It is generally considered that the concentration of foam solution in the plant influent should not exceed 1700 ppm (588 gal of plant influent per gallon of foam solution). This degree of dilution is normally sufficient to prevent shock loading and foaming in the plant. However, each wastewater treatment plant must be considered as a special case, and those planning a discharge of foam solution to a wastewater treatment facility should discuss this subject with the operator of the facility in advance. Diluting waste foam solution 588:1 with water is an impractical task for most facilities, especially when large quantities of foam solution are involved. The recommended procedure is to dilute the foam solution to the maximum amount practical and then meter the diluted solution into the sewer at a rate which, based on the total volume of plant influent, will produce a foam solution concentration of 1700 ppm or less. For example, if the discharge is to be made to a 6 million gal/day treatment plant, foam solution could be discharged at the rate of 7 gpm (6,000,000 gal/day divided by 1440 minutes/day divided by 588 equals 7 gpm). The difficulties of metering such a low rate of discharge can be overcome by first diluting the foam solution by 10:1 or 20:1, permitting discharge rates of 70 or 140 gpm respectively. Dilution should also be considered if the foam solution is to be discharged to the environment in order to minimize its impact. F.6.3.2 Defoamers. The use of defoamers will decrease, but not eliminate, foaming of the foam solution during pumping, dilution, and treatment. The foam manufacturer should be consulted for recommendations as to the choice of effective defoamers for use with a particular foam concentrate. F.6.3.3 Method for Determining the Effective Amount of Antifoam Apparatus. The effective amount of antifoam is determined by using the following apparatus: (1) Balance — 1600 gram capacity minimum — readability 0.2 gram maximum (2) One 2 L beaker or similar container (3) One 1 gal plastic or glass jug with cap (4) Eyedropper (5) Optional — 10 ml pipette F.6.3.3.1 Procedure. Proceed with the following instructions to determine the effective amount of antifoam: (1) In the 2 L beaker, weigh out 1 gram (1 ml) of antifoam using an eyedropper or the pipette. (2) Add 999 grams of water. (3) Mix well. (4) Weigh out 1000 grams of the solution to be defoamed and place it in the gallon jug. (5) Add 10 grams (10 ml) of the diluted antifoam to the gallon jug using the eyedropper or pipette, cap it and shake vigorously. (6) If the solution in the jug foams, go back to step 5 and repeat this step until little or no foam is generated by shaking the jug; keep a record of the number of grams (ml) that are required to eliminate the foaming. (7) The number of grams (ml) of diluted antifoam required to eliminate foaming is equal to the number of parts per million (ppm) of the antifoam as supplied that must be added to the solution to be defoamed. (8) Calculate the amount of neat antifoam to be added as follows: Volume of solution to be defoamed = V (U.S. gal) ppm of antifoam required = D Lb of antifoam required = W 8.32 V × D ÷ 1,000,000 = W F.6.3.3.2 Example. 10,000 gal of foam solution require defoaming. The procedure above has determined that 150 ppm of antifoam are needed to defoam this solution 8.32 × 10,000 × 150 ÷ 1,000,000 = 12.48 lb. (9) The amount of antifoam to be added will normally be quite small compared to volume of the solution to be defoamed. The antifoam must be uniformly mixed with the solution to be defoamed. It will aid in the achievement of this objective if the antifoam is diluted as much as is practical with water or the solution to be defoamed prior to addition to the solution containment area. The solution in the containment area must then be agitated to disperse the antifoam uniformly. One method of doing this is to use a fire pump to draft out of the containment area and discharge back into it using a water nozzle set on straight stream. Alternatively, if suitable metering equipment is available, antifoam as supplied or diluted antifoam can be metered into the solution discharge line at the proper concentration

F.7 Discharge of Foam Solution to Wastewater Treatment Facilities. Biological treatment of foam solution in a wastewater treatment facility is an acceptable method of disposal. However, foam solutions have the potential to cause plant upsets and other problems if not carefully handled. The reasons for this are explained in F.7.1 through F.7.4.

F.7.1 Fuel Contamination. Foam solutions have a tendency to emulsify hydrocarbon fuels and some polar fuels that are only slightly soluble in water. Water-soluble polar fuels will mix with foam solutions. The formation of emulsions will upset the operation of fuel/water separators and potentially cause the carryover of fuel into the waste stream. Many fuels are toxic to the bacteria in wastewater treatment plants. F.7.2 Foaming. The active ingredients in foam solutions will cause copious foaming in aeration ponds, even at very low concentrations. Aside from the nuisance value of this foaming, the foaming process tends to suspend activated sludge solids in the foam. These solids can be carried over to the outfall of the plant. Loss of activated sludge solids can also reduce the effectiveness of the wastewater treatment. This could cause water quality problems such as nutrient loading in the waterway to which the outfall is discharged. Because some surfactants in foam solutions are highly resistant to biodegradation, nuisance foaming may occur in the outfall waterway. F.7.3 BOD (Biological Oxygen Demand). Foam solutions have high BODs compared to the normal influent of a wastewater treatment plant. If large quantities of foam solution are discharged to a wastewater treatment plant, shock loading can occur, causing a plant upset. Before discharging foam solutions to a wastewater treatment plant, the plant operator should be contacted. This should be done as part of the emergency planning process. The plant operator will require, at a minimum, a Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) on the foam concentrate, an estimate of the five-day BOD content of the foam solution, an estimate of the total volume of foam solution to be discharged, the time period over which it will be discharged, and, if the foam concentrate is protein-based, an estimate of the ammonia nitrogen content of the foam solution. The foam manufacturer will be able to provide BOD and ammonia nitrogen data for the foam concentrate, from which the values for foam solution can be calculated. The other required information is site-specific and should be developed by the operator of the facility from which the discharge will occur.

F.9.1 Toxicity of Surfactants. Fire-fighting agents, used responsibly and following Material Safety Data Sheet instructions, pose little toxicity risk to people. However, some toxicity does exist. The toxicity of the surfactants in fire-fighting foams, including the fluorochemical surfactants, is a reason to prevent unnecessary exposure to people and to the environment. It is a reason to contain and treat all fire-fighting foam wastes whenever feasible. One should always make plans to contain wastes from training exercises and to treat them following the suppliersʼ disposal recommendations as well as the requirements of local authorities. Water that foams when shaken due to contamination from fire-fighting foam should not be ingested. Even when foaming is not present, it is prudent to evaluate the likelihood of drinking water supply contamination and to use alternate water sources until one is certain that surfactant concentrations of concern no longer exist. Suppliers of fire-fighting foams should be able to assist in evaluating the hazard and in recommending laboratories that can do appropriate analysis when necessary.

F.7.4 Treatment Facilities. Foam concentrates or solutions can have an adverse effect on microbiologically based oily water treatment facilities. The end user should take due account of this before discharging foam systems during testing or training. F.8 Foam Product Use Reporting. Federal (U.S.), state, and local environmental jurisdictions have certain chemical reporting requirements that apply to chemical constituents within foam concentrates. In addition, there are also requirements that apply to the flammable liquids to which the foams are being applied. For example, according to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the guidelines in E.8.1 through E.8.4 must be adhered to. F.8.1 Releases of ethylene glycol in excess of 5000 lb are reportable under U.S. EPA Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation & Liability Act (CERCLA), Sections 102(b) and 103(a). Ethylene glycol is generally used as a freeze-point suppressant in foam concentrates. F.8.2 As of June 12, 1995, the EPA issued a final rule 60 CFR 30926 on several broad categories of chemicals, including the glycol ethers. The EPA has no reportable quantity for any of the glycol ethers. Thus foams containing glycol ethers (butyl carbitol) are not subject to EPA reporting. Consult the foam manufacturersʼ MSDS to determine if glycol ethers are contained in a particular foam concentrate. F.8.3 The EPA does state that CERCLA liability continues to apply to releases of all compounds within the glycol ether category, even if reporting is not required. Parties responsible for releases of glycol ethers are liable for the costs associated with cleanup and any natural resource damages resulting from the release. F.8.4 The end user should contact the relevant local regulating authority regarding specific current regulations. F.9 Environmental Properties of Hydrocarbon Surfactants and Fluorochemical Surfactants. Fire-fighting foam agents contain surfactants. Surfactants or surface active agents are compounds that reduce the surface tension of water. They have both a strongly “water-loving” portion and a strongly “water-avoiding” portion. Dish soaps, laundry detergents, and personal health care products — such as shampoos — are common household products that contain hydrocarbon surfactants. Fluorochemical surfactants are similar in composition to hydrocarbon surfactants; however a portion of the hydrogen atoms have been replaced by fluorine atoms. Unlike chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and some other volatile fluorocarbons, fluorochemical surfactants are not ozone depleting and are not restricted by the Montreal Protocol or related regulations. Fluorochemical surfactants also have no effect on global warming or climate change. AFFF, Fluoroprotein Foam, and FFFP are foam liquid concentrates that contain fluorochemical surfactants. There are environmental concerns with use of surfactants that should be kept in mind when using these products for extinguishing fires or for fire training. These concerns are as follows: (1) All surfactants have a certain level of toxicity. (2) Surfactants used in fire-fighting foams cause foaming. (3) Surfactants used in fire-fighting foams can be persistent. (This is especially true of the fluorine containing portion of fluorochemical surfactants.) (4) Surfactants can be mobile in the environment. They can move with water in aquatic ecosystems and leach through soil in terrestrial ecosystems. F.9.1 through F.9.5 explain what each of these properties mean and what t

2009 https://www.nfpa.org/assets/files/AboutTheCodes/11/11-F2009-ROP.pdf

2011 https://www.nfpa.org/Assets/files/AboutTheCodes/11/11_FOM-AAA_F2014_FDBallotFinal.pdf

We need to make sure from here on in that if a manufacturer is aware of any toxic chemical used in the manufacting of, or that may degrade to form a toxic chemical, they need to tell us. The case of DuPont / Chemours is exactly the same in the PPE side of the issue. Take a look at the CEO of Chemours. Mark Vergnano. He came up through the ranks in DuPont. He made it to VP of DuPont Personal Protection. Then made his way over to Chemours as CEO.

TOXIC TRIFECTA: PFOS, PFOA,PFNA

YOUR TURNOUT GEAR AND PFOA·SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 11, 201853 Reads

I am deeply troubled thinking of the toxic soup the fire service has been fed for 40 years. While no one said nothing to you, these same companies that profess to have FF Cancer at the core of all they do is the most maniacal thing I’ve ever seen. 3M HID the toxic research from the EPA for 30 YEARS… DuPont/Chemours….. where do I begin… http://www.fluoridealert.org/wp-content/pesticides/effect.pfos.class.timeline.htm

If you are in the fire service, you understand the depths of this great omission. If you are not in the fire service, imagine the tobacco makers preaching lung cancer prevention to it’s customers, telling them their cancer is from air pollution or asbestos or anything but their cigarettes. YES it’s that obscene. DuPont is in everything FF Cancer related, our research, our FF cancer out-reach, even sponsoring the IAFF’s FF Cancer Symposium this year as well .. the list goes on and on..

The testing of samples of 2004 new, and never-worn turnout gear turned up 6 PFAS chemicals. The method used by Professor Peaslee could only tell us just the fraction of the potential that was in the samples.. read that again.. just the fraction is all it could tell us. That fraction had over 14,000 times the new PFOA MRL recommended by the 2018 CDC PFAS Toxilogical Profile FOR DRINKING WATER.. we’re not even close to talking about textile limits. Albeit the EPA has been ‘seeking PFOA comments since 2003’. They are still seeking comments. The testing also showed 279 ug/mL of PFNA or, C9. Again, that’s just the ‘fraction of the potential’ in the samples tested. https://station-pride.com/2018/02/18/fire-gear-laboratory-test-results/

PFNA concerns me as well, due to the nature of it’s effects on the spleen. So, what exactly have we been subjected to? When is the testing going to start, and when can we get answers to what we are wearing?

So, between the AFFF that is used in training and practical incidents (that we just saw the first Prop 65 ‘reproductive cancer warning’ on Viking 3% AFFF, and ., the PFOA/PFNA ., in PPE, what have we been subjected to really?

The list of fire stations with water wells testing elevated due to years of training with AFFF has not even been looked at. And yes we have sounded the alarm. Almost weekly we’re emailing EPA, CDC, IAFF, NFPA politicos and high ranking officials.

Nov 10, 2018. 90 days since Attorney #RobertBilott notified CDC/ATSDR that firefighters have earned that spot on the Pease AFB PFAS Concept Plan. Didn’t the firefighters on that base drink/shower/cook wash engines, hose down hangars, train with, the water too? We do not have another day to waste waiting for CDC and EPA to do something. They’ve been wringing their hands and asking for PFOA comments for over a decade, KNOWING YOU ARE WADING IN THIS STUFF.https://www.federalregister.gov/…/proposed-data-collection-…

What about the AFFF the FF’s are/were exposed to?

This is horrifying to me. The CDC is managing your FF Cancer Registry, and has omitted you from the PFAS concept plan. Where is the outrage fire service???

https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/firefighters/health.html

While we’re at it. The FOX study showed FF’s serum higher in PFOA and PFNA….. check out the results again from Professor Peaslee’s testing….. Remember, in 2015 we had no idea how much PFOA and PFNA was in our PPE. It wasn’t even a blip on the radar.

Biomonitoring in California Firefighters Metals and Perfluorinated Chemicals

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4274322/

Perfluorinated chemical multivariate models (Tables ​(Tables66 to ​to8)8) identified significantly higher (PFOSA) concentrations in firefighters aged 50 years or older. Monthly or more frequent responses to commercial fires were associated with higher PFHpA concentrations. Those who responded to hazardous materials incidents at least monthly had higher concentrations of 2-(N-methyl-perfluorooctane sulfonamido) (N-MeFOSAA) than those who did not, whereas any hazardous materials response was associated with significantly higher PFNA values. PFNA and PFOA were also significantly higher in firefighters whose turnout gear had not been professionally decontaminated within the last year. Participants who used Class A firefighting foam had significantly higher PFHpA concentrations than those who did not use any class of foam. Conclusions: Perfluorodecanoic acid concentrations were three times higher in this firefighter group than in NHANES adult males. Firefighters may have unidentified sources of occupational exposure to perfluorinated chemicals.

PFNA:

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4283221/

https://www.ewg.org/sites/humantoxome/chemicals/chemical.php?chemid=100306

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5204304/ :

PFOS, PFNA, and PFOA Sub-Lethal Exposure to Embryonic Zebrafish Have Different Toxicity Profiles in Terms of Morphometrics, Behavior and Gene Expression

https://www.omicsonline.org/acute-immunotoxic-effects-of-perfluorononanoic-acid-pfna-in-cbl-mice-2161-1459.S4-002.php?aid=14207#8

http://www.healthvermont.gov/sites/default/files/documents/pdf/ENV_DW_PFAS_HealthAdvisory.pdf

Yet still, we can’t get you studies for PFAS exposure…. stunning.

Toxological Profile 2018 CDC/ATSDR

https://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxprofiles/tp200.pdf

p. 536, ATSDR Tox Profile

Occupational Exposure:

“Individuals who perform jobs that require frequent contact with perfluoroalkyl-containing products, such as individuals who install and treat carpets or firefighters, are expected to have occupational exposure to these substances

Still, we’re not able to get doctors to write scripts to test our serum levels for pfas. Nor are we able to get any direction from the EPA OR CDC. They continue to run tests.. solicit comments… and they do not reply to emails with ANY plan for the fire service.

Diane Cotter

Your Turnout Gear and PFOA

Rindge, NH

In Response to CDC/ATSDR Omission of Firefighters to 100 Million Dollar PFAS Study.

In Response to CDC/ATSDR Omission of Firefighters to 100 Million Dollar PFAS Study.

On Thursday Feb 7, 2019 during the PEASE PFAS CAP the team members discussed fire fighters and what role if any they will have in the CDC/ATSDR National PFAS Study. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fUcHiV2kI5s&fbclid=IwAR2EEiI6ls0OzHlV7NyS3ZfVJvwPDQVkmW2veAnnq6g8OmBeZqrHyiD9xSw

The outcome was not in favor of the fire service, and, for the foresable future we will not be part of the National PFAS Study. Being immersed in this issue for 3? years now I have a good idea of what firefighter PFAS studies have taken place, and what studies are being done or planned. That said, we still have no overall plan for the fire service. We have numerous studies on firefighters and AFFF, or AFFF, or firefighters and cancer, products of combustion, ppe. But, we are missing a National Fire Service PFAS Protocol. We have no planning for a PFAS plan for the fire service. We know many of the 58,000 stations in the Nation held AFFF at one time, trained with it, and still store it. We know we have PFAS laden PPE degrading in firehouses across the nation, and we know we are wearing PFAS laden PPE as that is the only chemical that can meet NFPA 1971 per the manufacturers themselves.

The fire service has 1.4 million exposed Firefighters with no one to call on for answers. Unlike The water affected communities we have no agency overseeing us in the manner that is done for water affected communities.

We have no agencies coming to check our fire stations for drinking water where we cook, shower, and drink. We have no ability to ask for prescritions for serum draws. Having worked on two firefighters in the last month seeking serum draws it is a very complicated series of steps. In our case, in Massachusetts, my husbands physician is still seeking justification for his wanting a serum draw. In a case across the country, a highly exposed firefighter had his city administration deny his request for a serum draw. He is now paying for the test out of pocket.

We have no agency we can call on for community meetings like the military affected bases have around the country.

By omitting the FFs from the study Breysse Is tipping the scale in favor watered down results in an affected community. Firefighters did in fact drink, shower, and cook on this base. PFAS laden PPE is washed in extractors and then sent out into the water systems.

Daily actions in firehouses directly impact the water of affected military bases. PPE washed in fire-stations goes into the water ways and water treatment systems.

THE September 2018 DISCUSSION OF FF’S IN SEPTEMBER MINUTES OF PEASE CAP COMMITTEE shows the Testing for Pease advocates Andrea Amico and Alayna Davis asking about firefighters. These minutes also show Firefighter Russ Osgood sharing his own concerns about his PFAS levels and questioning if not AFFF where is it coming from?

https://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/sites/pease/documents/Pease-CAP-meeting-sept-2018-508.pdf

Page 31 Andrea Amico is asking about the monies for the PEASE PFAS Study, and Dr Breysse is answering that they have no restrictions on how to spend it (that is my understanding as I read this at least …)

DR. BREYSSE: So Congress gave the Department of Defense the authority to do direct transfers of resources to CDC.

MS. AMICO: Uh-huh.

DR. BREYSSE: They did not have that authority before so that authority means they give us the money and there’s no strings attached. So just to give you an example, the way we got the money before we had to sign a memorandum of understanding, essentially, with the DOD that described our roles together and we are, practically speaking, a subcontractor to the DOD for that first 10 million dollars and we had to agree, you know, to all these provisions going forward. None of that will have to be done with the future monies because now Congress said to the DOD you can just give money directly to CDC, you don’t have to go through the subcontract mechanism. So our hands are not tied in that regard and so we’re free to consider things like having open competition for sites for the multi-site study.

Page 35 Andrea is asking about the firefighters:

MS. AMICO: So I’m very happy to hear that, so thank you very much. So I guess my last question is, I just want to be clear because it recently came to my attention that the firefighters that were exposed here at Pease would not be eligible for this study and I would just really like to better understand from ATSDR why that is and talk about if they’re not eligible for this study are there plans to put them in their own study

DR. BOVE: Okay. I can answer part of that. I think it’s important that firefighters be evaluated as a separate group because their exposures are unique. And I think that — so that’s one issue. And the entity that would most likely follow firefighters is the entity that’s already doing that which is NIOSH. They have three firefighter cohorts. Unfortunately, when I discussed this issue with them several years ago they said that these firefighters were not using AFFF very much so they didn’t think it was a good cohort to study. So a different cohort would have to be identified. But the reason we’re not including them in this study is because we’re focusing on drinking water, we want to use the drinking water contamination levels to predict what serum levels are over time and do a cumulative serum, PFAS serum evaluation similar to what the C8 study did. And the advantages to doing that are that if you use the actual biomonitoring results for PFAS there are some bias issues that could arise from particular end points and particular kidney end points, but there are other end points that are involved with reproductive end points that we’re not looking at, but we wanted to be able to not only use the biomonitoring results in these analyses but also to estimate cumulative PFAS serum levels. And it’s hard enough to do that with the drinking water. We would — it would be really impossible for us to figure out in addition to the drinking water exposures what amount of PFAS a firefighter might’ve been exposed to either through training or putting a fire out. And so it’s complicated. When the C8 study they included industrial workers but that’s because — and along

Page 38

with the community exposures but that’s because they already had done estimates of cumulative exposure, PFAS exposure with these workers with information from the work place itself so they can do that. And oftentimes they separate the two groups out in the analysis as well. You know, so again, because of this issue of the firefighters are diff — the industrial workers in this case were different than the community exposures. So in order to maintain a clean study which — it will be difficult to estimate cumulative exposure from the drinking water situation, we’re going to have to do some modeling, we’re going to have to make some assumptions, it’s not easy to do that. It just adds a whole other layer of complexity and uncertainty by adding in occupational exposures, whether it’s firefighters or other occupations that involve PFAS not from drinking water but from working with the material either in production or manufacturing or whatever. So those are the reasons why we excluded all occupational PFAS exposures from this study. One thing to keep in mind is that the evidence that we get from these studies, this study, the multi-site study and all the other studies that have been done, both the C8 studies, the occupational studies, all that evidence can be used to

ll that evidence can be used to understand what the health effects of these chemicals are. We did something similar at Lejeune. We were asked by the Veterans Affairs to evaluate the evidence and most of the evidence that we looked at and used in building a case for which diseases the VA should give presumption for were based on occupational studies, they weren’t based on Camp Lejeune studies because most of the information is from occupational studies. In this case with PFAS there are some occupational studies. Some of them are very small and in that case they’re weak because they’re small numbers. More of the studies are from community exposures so we’re learning a lot more about PFAS health effects from those. All that evidence though is relevant both to firefighters, to workers who work with it and to people who get exposed from drinking water as well as from consumer products. So that — so you don’t have to be, in other words, you don’t have to be in a study to have all this evidence relevant to your situation.

MS. AMICO: Okay. I just have a couple follow up questions to that. So has ATSDR — is it, I guess, let me start with, is it appropriate for ATSDR to approach NIOSH and say we have a group of firefighters at Pease who had drinking water exposure and occupational exposure and we’re going to be doing multi-site study? I imagine other communities have firefighters that are also exposed, you know, across the nation that will be participating in the multi-site study. So is there any way to make this a separate study and would NIOSH be willing to partner with the ATSDR or is it appropriate for you guys to talk to them about that?

DR. BREYSSE: Yes, yes.

MS. AMICO: Okay. And have you talked to them about —

DR. BOVE: Yes.

MS. AMICO: — it recently?

DR. BOVE: Not recently, no I have not. No.

MS. AMICO: Okay.

DR. BOVE: But again, we’d have to think about what the best cohort would be. The the best cohort would be. There are firefighters at airports. There are firefighters at the military bases. There are firefighters who work in our communities. And the ones that NIOSH has been following apparently, according to them, did not use AFFF much and so that wouldn’t be a good cohort. But so you’d have to think about what would be the best group to follow of firefighters, you know. And you know, so we have to think about that. I mean it seems to me that there are a lot of fire — — there are a lot of firefighters and fire training going on at the military bases. The question is how good the data is to identify them. The data I’ve seen from the Defense Manpower Data Center, which is the personnel data for the military, is iffy when it comes to occupational information. So it may be difficult to do — to really assemble a good cohort there. But these are the kinds of questions we’d have to ask. How — what’s the best information we can use to actually define a cohort that we’re pretty sure uses AFFF at least on a routine basis or more often than not as opposed to, as I said, the NIOSH cohort. And then how can we assemble them, what information will help us assemble that group and then we can follow them over time. So that’s — these are the questions NIOSH also has to grapple with.

MS. AMICO: Okay. I would just like to continue to revisit these conversations because I know that is a group of people we don’t want to forget about here. And I hear you that everyone will benefit from this study and we’re all going to benefit from that information. But I think when people are exposed and they had no control on that exposure and they want to participate in something, it’s like a way — it’s you know, I don’t know, just I would hate to think that these people who have had a significant exposure, not only through the drinking water, through the foam, now we know it’s in their gear too. I just, I don’t know, maybe I’m coming at it from a more emotional place but I feel like we need to be paying attention to that group too and we can’t forget about them and they’re actually a really important population we need to learn from because of their exposure. So I want to continue this conversation about how the firefighters here can somehow play into maybe not this study but another possible study, whether it’s with NIOSH or whatever. I think we need to keep those conversations open.

Russ Osgood is a firefighter:

His question put it in perspective about his serum level and now the PPE….

MR. OSGOOD: I have the same, I just — while we’re on the firefighter thing — I had the same — I had the exact same question. And I understand why because it’s a drinking water study that we’re removing firefighters, I understand that. But is there any way that we can, I know you can talk to NIOSH or I can approach NIOSH and request this, but just saying because of AFFF to me is not enough.

Like I think we need to say there’s multiple places that firefighters are exposed to this, through our firefighting equipment, AFFF, you know, there’s lots of areas. So I just, I’m a little concerned that we’ve narrowed it down just to AFFF because I’ve been in the fire service for quite a long time and we used AFFF early on in my career but we haven’t used AFFF in years so it’s, you know, but it’s still our — my levels are up and many of my members’ levels are up and that’s concerning. If it’s not the drinking water, you know, and it’s not AFFF, there’s something else in there.

DR. BOVE: Right. And again —

MR. OSGOOD: I’d love to get the answers to that

DR BOVE: Yeah.

MR. OSGOOD: And I know that’s outside of what you’re studying, but if we can work together to try to move that along that would be wonderful.

DR. BOVE: Well there may be, again, NIOSH is following these cohorts.

MR. OSGOOD: Yeah.

DR. BOVE: And they said they don’t use AFFF much, but they wear this equipment -

MR. OSGOOD: Which they’re probably accurate.

DR. BOVE: — but they wear the equipment as you were pointing out. There may be some value, you know, if we can convince NIOSH of this or if it fits in with their protocol to do that, work with them, with the cohorts they’re following. Again, I would think that if we can identify those firefighters who are actually training with it and using it more routinely and that would maybe be military bases and airports. If we can identify —

DR. BREYSSE: Of course some industrial firefighters as well.

DR. BOVE: Yeah, if we can find —

DR. BREYSSE: Refineries and chemical plants.

DR. BOVE: Yeah, right. Yeah, and again you’d have to be able to figure out a way to identify them.

MR. OSGOOD: Okay. D

DR. BREYSSE: So Cliff, I think Alayna’s had her —

CDR MUTTER: There’s somebody on the phone.

DR. CARIGNAN: Pardon me, can I jump in on that comment? Can you guys hear me?

(SIDE NOTE: this is Courtney Carignan, she’s been magnificent every step of the way in this issue with PPE when I found her 2/3 years ago… she is one of the dozen scientists that has been helping in this PPE journey, when it began 3 years ago I began reaching out to area scientists and she was magnificent with her immediate responses and information. dc)

DR. BREYSSE: Sure.

CAPT SOMERS: Sort of.

DR. CARGINAN: So I’ve been talking with firefighters as well, this is — I think we all hear from them quite frequently, are concerned about it, and I recently heard from a firefighter who works at a base that uses AFFF. But NIOSH came out years ago, I mean three years ago and collected a bunch of data and came back telling them to to wear PPE, but haven’t done much else and I know that I’ve reached out to NIOSH. I’ve suggested to firefighters with concerns to reach out to NIOSH and really it doesn’t seem like any of us are getting anywhere. At least getting much of a response from NIOSH and I was just wondering if you all would be able to help — help community firefighters to sort of get an audience with NIOSH and get them to engage in a similar way that you guys are engaging with the Pease community. Maybe that is a way to move forward on this issue.

DR. BREYSSE: Well, we’ll do our best. That’s a great suggestion.

DR CARIGNAN: Thank you.

DR. BREYSSE: So Alayna your card was up first but if you don’t mind, if you have a firefighter question —

MR. LAZENBY: I do.

DR. BREYSSE: — okay, good. Just want to keep a thread going.

MS. DAVIS: Okay. So I have a few questions. One was I thought I read something in the proof of concept that was regarding sampling tap water, so can you clarify who that would apply to? Was it part of the unexposed population to make sure that those people weren’t exposed at their homes?

DR. BOVE: No, that was never in the protocol.

MS. DAVIS: It wasn’t?

MR. BOVE: No.

MS. DAVIS: Okay. So I’ll have to look back at that. All right. So can you tell us again what years the participants would’ve had to have been exposed on Pease for the Pease study?

DR. BOVE: Right. Well in the protocol we’re saying from any time between 2004 and 2014. 2004 was we thought that after 15 years, if your last exposure was later — was longer ago than 15 years ago, given the half-life of PFHxS, we thought we wouldn’t see much in the blood so we thought that would be a cut off. And looking at those who went through the biomonitoring program, the vast majority were exposed in that window. So — but we can relax that. It just makes it harder to figure out — if they weren’t exposed — if their last exposure was 2003 or earlier it may be hard to estimate what their levels are, given what we see now, you know. So that’s one of the concerns. But we’re not going to — again, we’re going to focus on those who went through the biomonitoring. If we can we’d like to limit it to those people who were last exposed no more than 15 years ago. If we have to relax that we will to reach our sample size goals, but hopefully we won’t have to do that.

MS. DAVIS: Okay. So if anyone within that time frame participated in fire training exercises on Pease they would be eliminated from the study because that would be considered an occupational hazard?

DR. BOVE: Yeah. If they have occupational exposure, whether it’s a firefighter or industrial worker who worked with the substance, yeah.

MS. DAVIS: Okay.

DR. BOVE: So it’s just, again, we want to focus on drinking water exposures so that we can actually estimate cumulative PFAS serum levels over time.

(….. The exposed community is being omitted because they want to determine drinking water exposure over a level of time. We’re being excluded for this reason? We did drink the water, shower in the water, cook with the water, wash PPE with the water…… dc )

MS. DAVIS: Okay. And then — I don’t know if I’m going to ask this question so that you get it, but hopefully you do. So in the end the goal, is it to — is it to determine just the risks from drinking water exposure to PFAS or just — or is it actually based on the serum level in your blood, no matter how you were exposed?

MR BOVE: It’s based on the serum level.

MS. DAVIS: Okay.

DR. BOVE: It’s based on the serum level of both the actual measured serum level and as I said, the cumulative serum level. Again, following the model of the C8 study.

MS. DAVIS: Okay. So then the people who were exposed occupationally still would get data from that because it’s based on what their blood level would be versus how they were exposed.

DR. BOVE: Well, no. The — again, we’re going to exclude those people who were occu —

DR. BREYSSE: The data will be —

MS. DAVIS: The data —

DR. BREYSSE: — informative — M

S. DAVIS: — yeah, the data will give them information —

DR. BREYSSE: — of that.

DR. BOVE: Right. That’s what I was saying before —

MS. DAVIS: Okay

DR. BOVE: — yeah. I’m sorry, I misunderstood your question.

MS. DAVIS: Okay. Yeah, okay. Thank you

DR. BREYSSE: So just to be a little bit clearer, ATSDR’s mission is to address community health concerns about hazardous waste and hazardous materials released into the environment. So our entrée here is the contaminated water from an industrial site, in this case, from a defense facility. That’s what Congress asked us to do, that’s our mandate and so that’s why we’re focusing on the water. We want to understand a little bit about maybe what the consumer products people are exposed to. Remember there’s a big burden of exposure from consumer products as well, but we’re really focusing on the water because that’s ATSDR’s mission. Cliff.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Well, there is MUCH hazardous waste from our PPE….. What comes off the PPE and into the water systems of communities is of great concern. Professor Peaslee is studying that right now. Professor Peaslee is finishing up his testing on 20 years worth of new, never worn PPE. He will send his work for peer review and publish promptly.

This is the cohort study that Dr Breysee mentions as having been used to study 30,000 firefighters. We call it the FOX Study. Here are the serum results : https://www.researchgate.net/publication/270662382_Biomonitoring_in_California_Firefighters_Metals_and_Perfluorinated_Chemicals

Conclusions: Perfluorodecanoic acid concentra-tions were three times higher in this firefighter group than in NHANES adult males. Firefighters may have unidentified sources of occupational exposure to perfluorinated chemical

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

On September 5, 2017 Environmental Attorney Robert Bilott along with C8 Science Panel member Dr Paul Brooks, and Fire Chief Jeffrey Hermes, sent the following 195 page letter to CDC/ATSDR, EPA, and (then) US Attorney Jeff Sessions demanding studies and testing for first responders.

https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3988104-Firefighter-Letter.html

On September 12, 2018, when he saw the first responders were omitted from the CDC/ATSDR PEASE PFAS Concept Plan, he sent a 48 page letter challenging that decision.

On October 4th, 2018 Attorney Bilott filed a National Class Action with Fire Chief Kevin Hardwick. They are seeking testing and studies for anyone harmed by these chemicals.

https://theintercept.com/2018/10/06/dupont-pfas-chemicals-lawsuit/

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

The letter below from Commander Kenny Fent of NIOSH is from July of 2018… It is in response to the many emails I send/sent regarding the non action of government to act on checking fire stations for PFAS exposure. Due to years of training with AFFF and of course the still unknown amounts of PFAS in our turnout gear.

This letter is from Commander Kenny Fent of NIOSH:

July 25, 2018

Diane Cotter

Dear Diane Cotter:

Thank you for your email regarding perfluoroalkyl substance (PFAS) contamination in the fire service for career, volunteer, wildland, and military first responders. The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) is familiar with this concern and actively engaged in research on occupational exposure to these compounds and other persistent organic compounds. NIOSH is also part of a large network of federal agencies, including the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Department of Defense (DOD) among others, evaluating the exposure and risk of a number of PFAS compounds including GenX chemicals (also a member of the PFAS family). NIOSH regularly communicates our applicable research findings to these other federal agencies with the goal of expanding our collective understanding of human exposure to PFAS and other persistent organic compounds.

As you may know, PFAS were used in multiple products in the United States, such as stain resistant and water repellant coatings on fabrics and textiles, including those used in the fire service. PFAS were also used as surfactants in the aqueous film forming foams (AFFF) that fire departments may use to suppress industrial fires, chemical fires, or other fires that are difficult to suppress with water. Because of the environmental persistence, bioaccumulation, and toxicity concerns, many PFAS compounds have been phased out in the United States. In many cases, shorter-chain fluorinated compounds are being used as replacements in the aforementioned products. These replacements are much less persistent in the environment and are typically short-lived in the human body. However, further toxicity research on these replacement chemicals is needed. Because AFFF foams have long shelf lives, some departments may still have legacy PFAS-containing AFFF foams in stock.

NIOSH is currently engaged in ongoing research studies to examine PFAS exposure in the fire service. In a 2015 collaborative study with the University of Illinois, where firefighters suppressed controlled residential fires, NIOSH collected blood from 36 U.S. firefighters for the analysis of PFAS compounds. The results from this study may provide an indication of the biological levels of PFAS among a select group of firefighters. Data from this study are still undergoing analysis, but we hope to publish the findings within the next year.

NIOSH is also working with the Universities of Miami and Arizona on a prospective firefighter cancer cohort study. As part of this study, samples of firefighter participants’ blood are being collected for PFAS analysis. One goal is to expand this cohort to include firefighters who are more likely to use or have used PFAS-containing AFFF foams, such as industrial firefighter trainers. This study is still in the early phases, so it will take some time to publish the results.

Page 2 — Diane Carter

NIOSH is also considering other studies focused on occupational exposure to PFAS, including GenX chemicals.

Your email raised concern regarding the carcinogenicity of PFAS compounds. There are many risk factors for cancer, including diet, physical fitness, and chemical exposures. Firefighters may be exposed to numerous combustion byproducts that are known human carcinogens, including polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), benzene, formaldehyde, and vinyl chloride. Much of the research at NIOSH has focused on these known human carcinogens. It is currently unknown how PFAS-containing AFFF foams and firefighting textiles contributed to the systemic levels of PFAS in firefighters, and further, how these exposures then contributed to health outcomes. While studies certainly indicate that firefighters have an increased risk of certain types of cancer, linking these cancers to specific exposures is very difficult.

Generally, scientists can only provide evidence for causality, but can rarely provide proof of causality. It becomes even more difficult to provide evidence of causality when the exposure has changed substantially over time. Because some PFAS compounds have been phased out of a variety of products, including recent turnout gear ensembles, firefighters’ exposures may also be different today than decades ago. This is further compounded by the fact that firefighters could have PFAS exposures from combustion sources (depending on what is burning) or be exposed outside the workplace (depending on furniture, carpeting, etc. used in the home). Despite these complexities, we are fully dedicated to understanding firefighters’ exposures to all chemicals and identifying ways of minimizing those exposures and any related health effects.

Thank you for your concern and outreach on this important topic. Please be on the lookout for informative articles on firefighters’ exposures to PFAS and other persistent organic compounds as we publish findings from our research over the next few years. These results will also be shared broadly with the U.S. fire service organizations.

Sincerely,

Kenneth Fent, PhD, CIH

Research Industrial Hygienist

CDR, U.S. Public Health Service

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

Dear Kenny,

With all due respect, this response does nothing to support a national protocol for the fire service.

Every single fire station in the nation that trained with AFFF is at risk.

Every single fire station in the nation that houses PPE is at risk.

Every single fire fighter should have serum tested.

Every single fire fighter should be included in the National PFAS Register.

I’m at a loss to understand why the alarm is not being sounded for the fire service here in the USA as it is in Australia, where their union has ordered the serum testing for all fire fighters?

Or why we are not conducting symposiums as is done in Europe to educate the fire service on the chemicals used in the making of the protective ensembles. And the end of life disposal methods.

We must have limits of PFAS chemicals in our gear now. Not in the future. As has been done in the EU by the demands of ECHA.

25ppb PFOA in PPE and 1ppm precursors.

We must have labeling in our gear now on a national scale as has been instituted in Washington State. Notifying the fire fighter that the garment contains PFAS chemicals which are known to be endocrine disruptions.

The 385 page ECHA background document on PFAS goes into great discussion about fire fighters.Their occupational exposure from the gear via routes of exposure; dermal, ingestion, inhalation. From the gear.

These are all protocols we must provide now. Not in the future.

You are the most respected man in the fire service Kenny. You and I have spoken on the phone about this issue. We spoke about the events in Europe and I sent you all of the material on their events.

This is not enough. We must have a plan now. Today.

We know the chemicals are in the gear. The new PFAS may be even worse.

We know they live in fire stations that have had gear degrading for decades. We know in the 80’s, 90’s, the fire service drilled using AFFF. If they drilled with AFFF in their own yards, they ARE at risk for water / soil contamination.

We need a national plan for the fire service. The testing and studies are wonderful and needed. But this is not a plan Kenny. We know they are occupational exposed. The new CDC PFAS Toxicological Profile states it.

We need a national fire service PFAS protocol.

Where do we turn now? If CDC is not going to do this? Who will put this national project together?

Sincerely,

Diane Cotter

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

This 1977 NIOSH document shows just how long we can play kick the can down the road… we are still not any closer to a comprehensive plan for the fire service.

https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/pdfs/77-193a.pdf?id=10.26616/NIOSHPUB77193

None of that will have to be done with the future monies because now Congress said to the DOD you can just give money directly to CDC, you don’t have to go through the subcontract mechanism. So our hands are not tied in that regard and so we’re free to consider things like having open competition for sites for the multi-site study.” Dr Breysse.

If this statement is true, then I would ask that Dr Breysse name the fire service as a ‘site’.

Diane Cotter

Your Turnout Gear and PFOA

2.10.19


List of Municipal and Rural Fire Stations that have been tested and show elevated levels of PFOA

List of Municipal and Rural Fire Stations that have been tested and show elevated levels of PFOA

See Link for How To Test Your Station:

YOUR TURNOUT GEAR AND PFOA·THURSDAY, JANUARY 24, 2019

This is the only known printout I’m aware of that discusses how to test your water wells. It does list the testing facilities that will test your water. I don’t have answers on how to test for your city water but you could contact your DES if you suspected your station used AFFF in years past to train.

Please help us update this list by reporting any known fire stations/training sites. It is our understanding the DoD is /was testing water on all military bases. The muni/rural fire houses have largely gone unnoticed.

https://www4.des.state.nh.us/nh-pfas-investigation/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Fire_Department_H20Sample.pdf

KNOWN FIRE STATIONS WITH PFAS CONTAMINATION

Last Update 1/21/2019

https://www.facebook.com/notes/your-turnout-gear-and-pfoa/instructions-for-testing-your-water-at-your-fire-stationfor-pfas/2117306748593397/

Environmental Scientist and New Hampshire State Representative has written about the new ‘short chain’ chemistry and it’s unknown effects in her May 2018 article, ‘Firefighter Cancer Quadfecta’.

http://nhlabornews.com/2018/05/mindi-messmer-firefighter-cancer-quadfecta/

In October 2017, 6 out of 7 fire stations tested ‘elevated’ for PFAS. That prompted the New Hampshire DES to send out this letter instructing all fire stations in NH to test their water:

http://mediad.publicbroadcasting.net/p/nhpr/files/firestation_results_des_12-4-17.pdf

OCTOBER 2017., NOTICE TO ALL NEW HAMPSHIRE FIRE STATIONS: https://www4.des.state.nh.us/…/Fire_Department_H20Sample.pdf

August, 2018, The state of Michigan listed 1,487 fire stations to the ‘Potentially PFAS Contaminated Sites’ list. In response to that notice, we asked Professor Peaslee his thoughts:In response to Michigan’s 1487 Fire Stations on the Potential PFAS Contamination List, and in addition to the OCTOBER 2017 NH DES Notice to all New Hampshire Fire Stations… From Professor Peaslee today:

https://www.mlive.com/…/pa…/michigans_water_crisis_pfas.html

In this article, they list six fire departments that have legacy AFFF sitting on their shelves unused….and the town of Parchment is one of the six they mention….there are 35 gallons of AFFF concentrate sitting in the Parchment fire department unused. I am afraid this may indicate the source of their groundwater contamination…. Parchment is a small city (1800 residents) and city hall is attached to the fire department (which has 19 permanent employees) which also houses the city’s Public Works and Water Department. All the well heads for the city’s drinking water (which is from an aquifer 50 feet below the city in sandy soil) are within a mile of the FD. Since they have 35 gallons of unused AFFF sitting on their shelves at the moment, they are probably like most small towns near an interstate that purchased and practiced putting out fires you might encounter from a tanker-truck crash. Not sure they ever had a crash in this part of Kalamazoo, but they surely practiced with the foam at some point after they purchased it, otherwise they wouldn’t have “leftover” foam sitting on a shelf. If they practiced anywhere within city limits, they probably washed the foam away afterwards, and nobody told them 20 years ago that AFFF would travel directly into the groundwater and last for the next few hundred years environmentally. This is pure conjecture at the moment from me., there may be another source of PFAS that comes to light eventually, but I have been telling as many people in Michigan as possible to look into it, and today Michigan listed all FD’s as potential sources of PFAS and I am guessing that Parchment might be the reason for this action. In a worst-case scenario, Every “small town USA” may have purchased and used AFFF in fire stations around the country and nobody told them it was toxic, nor persistent and a danger to groundwater. Thereafter, any use or practice with this AFFF could potentially have contaminated their own drinking water. This is scary, and maybe Parchment is the only place in the country this has happened, but my bigger fear is that it is only the first place we have looked.

THE FIRE STATIONS THAT WE KNOW OF WITH HIGH LEVELS OF PFOA /PFOS :

Additionally, some the fire stations listed below came from EWG’S list of contaminated sites. These are merely the ‘known’ sites…. we continue to add to this list with recent developments of more fire stations found with 3M toxic foam or that have water wells in excess of MRLs for PFOA/PFOS. Without the funding to test fire stations across the country the fire fighters that work/sleep/eat in their stations may never be informed, and we may be sitting on just the tip of the iceberg. All, please see below for the numerous fire stations that have been contaminated by AFFF.

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1HxLAzOmFdMh7V-mey4ExTPsnNKarEcGG6klBWZH8auA/edit#gid=676990244

ALASKA:

Fairbanks Regional Fire Training Center, PFASs found in 26/33 private wells, 19 exceeded EPA health advisory (2015); {GHU municipal water 2018 — PFOS: 2.4–2.9 ppt, PFOA: 2.9–3.5 ppt}; {Airport — PFOA: 6.4–762 ppt} GHU municipal water 2018 — PFHxS: 5.1–5.9 ppt, PFHxA: 2.8–3.2 ppt Firefighting foam used from 1984 to 2004 in fire training exercises at the Regional Fire Training Center, and at Fairbanks International Airport since the 1980s https://dec.alaska.gov/spar/csp/sites/fairbanks-fire-training-center

1/21/2019 Alaska: Dillingham Airport:

http://dot.alaska.gov/creg/dillingham-pfas/docs/Dillingham-PFAS-Press-Release.pdf

. Nine wells were sampled on or near airport property. The Holy Rosary Church well tested at 186 parts per trillion (ppt) for the sum of five PFAS compounds, which exceeds the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) action level of 70 ppt. The eight other wells that were tested ranged from not detected to 22 ppt.

https://alaska-native-news.com/pfas-discovered-in-groundwater-near-dillingham-airport-firefighting-foam-discharge-areas/39699/

ARIZONA

1/21/2019 Tucson International Airport

https://cronkitenews.azpbs.org/2019/01/03/tucson-water-treatment-plant-contamination/#.XDde6Rmdz5E.facebook

https://cumulis.epa.gov/supercpad/cursites/csitinfo.cfm?id=0900684

The 10-square-mile Tucson International Airport Area site is located in and next to Tucson, Arizona. The site includes the Tucson International Airport, portions of the Tohono O’Odham Indian Reservation (San Xavier District), residential areas of Tucson and South Tucson, and the Air Force Plant #44 Raytheon Missile Systems Company (AFP44). Former aircraft and electronics manufacturing activities, fire drill training activities, and unlined landfills contaminated groundwater and soil. Cleanup, operation and maintenance activities, and monitoring are ongoing.

COLORADO:Sugarloaf Fire DepartmentStation 1 Well: [PFOA = 79 ppt; PFOS = 950 ppt], Station 2 Well: [above 70 ppt, numbers unavailable] Firefighting foam used at Sugarloaf Fire Department Fire district board members will join representatives from EPA, Boulder County Health Dept, and Colorado Dept. of Health & Environment in a community meeting to brief residents on the status of contamination. Boulder County Health Dept. paid for testing of 12 wells near the two fire stations. “The water quality control division of (the department) has allocated funds that we will be distributing to Boulder County Public Health and then we will work with both the Fire District and Boulder County Public Health and our Region 8 EPA office to determine the best path forward in determining where and when we should best sample,” said Dr. Kristy Richardson, environmental toxicologist for the Colorado Dept of Public Health & Environment

FLORIDA

1/21/2019 https://www.tampabay.com/florida-politics/buzz/2019/01/03/florida-officials-delayed-telling-residents-about-bad-water/

Lawson’s home was one of three well sites — a Marion County fire station and Texas-based mining company Lhoist North America were the others — where preliminary tests indicated the water had elevated levels of the chemicals, which early studies have suggested can be carcinogens. Other impacts in humans include high cholesterol, thyroid disorders, adverse reproductive and developmental effects and some types of cancer.

In September state health officials began discussing means of informing the Fire College, but it wasn’t until late October that they discussed notifying the rest of the nearby community.

The department notified residents on Nov. 5 — two months after the Fire College started using bottled water and three days after tests results showed contamination in their wells.

Water contamination near the Fire College was made known to officials in early September after results came back from testing done by the state’s Department of Environmental Protection. Of the 80 to 90 wells in a mile radius around the college, 16 wells were initially tested. According to emails obtained by the Times/Herald, levels of chemicals in the water at the college were found to be between 250 and 270 parts per trillion, more than three times higher than the advisable 70 parts per trillion for drinking water.

▪ On Sept. 9, the Fire College was given supplies of bottled water from the Department of Environmental Protection. On Sept. 12, the Fire College stopped using well water to prepare food in its cafeteria. During busy times of the year, about 50 students and 30 staff use the water on campus.

▪ On Oct. 2nd and 3rd, the DOH collected samples from 16 nearby wells, including the Lowell Correctional Institution (a women’s prison), a convenience store/gas station, the mining company and seven residences.

▪ An Oct. 16 open house was scheduled to allow members of the public and the Fire College community to ask questions and get information about what was happening in their water supply. The open house was rescheduled due to limited time and resources after Hurricane Michael. It eventually happened on Dec. 4 — three months after the Fire College started using bottled water.

▪ On Nov. 2, the Department of Health got results back from the tests in early October and found four wells, including the Fire College, that showed elevated PFOS and PFOA levels.

▪ On Nov. 5 — two months after the Fire College started using bottled water and three days after test results showed far higher levels of contamination in their wells — letters were sent to notify Lawson and the fire station. On Nov. 6, Election Day, the mining business was notified. The Department of Environmental Protection installed filters for their wells and is providing a regular supply of bottled water for drinking, cooking, bathing and other household activities.

Those letters were supposed to be sent on Nov. 13, Beitsch said, but pushback from him and some of his colleagues spurred the Nov. 5 delivery.

All Lawson could gather from the two-page letter was that the Fire College might be connected to the water problem.

“We’ve known the Fire College was there. It’s been there forever,” she said. “I knew they did testing back there — fire drills and stuff like that — but I assumed they did water or whatever. I didn’t even know they use a foam.”

https://www.ocala.com/news/20181224/ex-workers-at-florida-state-fire-college-file-suit

The Florida Department of Environmental Protection tested wells at the college in August. In two of the three wells, which provide the college’s water supply, officials found levels of the toxic chemicals in the water to be between 250 and 270 parts per trillion, almost four times higher than the EPA recommended 70 parts per trillion for drinking water.

MASSACHUSETTS

Barnstable County Firefighting Training Academy. Please see page 18 for PFOS contamination map of over 70,000 ppt notedin red dots. http://www.newmoa.org/events/docs/259_227/GallagherMA_May2017_final.pdf

In MA, there is Westfield NG fire station on the NG AFB affecting the whole NW side of Westfield (from Geoff Daly, Engineer/Citizen Advocate)

Martha’s Vinyard, West Tisbury. Airport (added to list 12/13/18)

https://vineyardgazette.com/news/2018/12/03/airport-officials-confirm-groundwater-contamination-pledge-more-testing?fbclid=IwAR06dKtkzh-J5xuHeAN3qTcdgJo3MLFhbrzul1HqqerjZS7EshHubBlAr08

From airport fire station training area.

MICHIGAN

Added 1/21/2019

https://www.michigan.gov/pfasresponse/0,9038,7-365-86511_82704-487728--,00.html

https://www.scribd.com/document/397761205/MAP-Bishop-Airport-Landfill-643963-7#from_embed

On October 16, 2018, MDEQ collected 6 groundwater samples on behalf of the city of Flint to analyze for PFAS. They were collected from the previously existing monitoring wells on the landfill.

On November 7, 2018, the MDEQ received the results from the groundwater sampling. The highest values were 176 ppt PFOS+PFOA, and 1,236.3 ppt total PFAS.

1/21/2019 MUSKEGON COUNTY, MICHIGAN: https://www.mlive.com/news/muskegon/2019/01/pfas-found-in-20-additional-muskegon-area-drinking-water-wells.html?ath=3f9f78fa41012c192861e519f2dd9856&fbclid=IwAR1o8fqR1LlBh-EDpEXvWzMJBREY7DA9S9DaANv3kP1hy_KAaTEXO2CIKYk#cmpid=nsltr_strybutton

In addition, the county is currently seeking its own engineering contractor for PFAS monitoring and potential remediation. Those bids are due on Jan. 17.

Michigan’s next water crisis is PFAS — and you may already be affected

“We are ready to respond for the safety of our residents at any time,” said Moore. “Any time we know of PFAS (close to the 70-ppt advisory level), and if residents are concerned, we do advise them to use bottled water, consider connecting to a municipal water source or get a filter in their homes.”

Steve Fink, an engineer working with Muskegon County Public Works, said the county won’t know how much monitoring or remediation will cost until a contractor can investigate the area and understand the scope of the problem.

Fink said the Norton Shores groundwater investigation was spurred by interviews with former city firefighters who said they used a firefighting foam that contained per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances, or PFAS, during training exercises at four points around the airport for several decades.

MINNESOTA

(by far the most comprehensive study of what was used, how stored,and when used)DELTA PROJECT NO. 19382-DEL0 These three reports are based mainly on municipal/rural AFFF at fire fighting training locations:

2008: https://www.pca.state.mn.us/sites/default/files/pfc-foamreport-addendum.pdf

2009: https://www.pca.state.mn.us/sites/default/files/c-pfc1-05.pdf

2010: https://www.pca.state.mn.us/sites/default/files/c-pfc1-09.pdf

from page 22: The PFOA HRL was exceeded in several groundwater sample collected during the current scopes of work and previous scopes of work with laboratory results being presented in this report: 1,260 ng/L PFOA was detected in the groundwater sample collected from the Burnsville B-3 boring; and, PFOA concentrations ranging from 958 ng/L to 286,000 ng/L were detected in all four groundwater samples collected in May 2009 from borings B-1 through B-4 at the MSP Airport. PFOA concentrations detected in other groundwater samples collected during the current scopes of work and in Fridley and Luverne were less than 300 ng/L page 23: The PFOS HRL was exceeded in several samples collected during the current scopes of work: 522 ng/L PFOS was detected in the Burnsville B-3 groundwater sample; 483 ng/L and 789 ng/L PFOS were detected in the Bemidji B-1 and B-2 groundwater samples, respectively; and, PFOS concentrations ranging from 731 ng/L to 14,900 ng/L were detected in five of the six groundwater samples collected at the Marathon Refinery, including the duplicate sample. The only groundwater sample collected at the Marathon Refinery with a PFOS concentration of less than 300 ng/L was MW-101, which is located near Tank 120 upgradient of the firefighting training area. The PFOS concentrations in other groundwater samples collected during the current scopes of work and in Fridley and Luverne were less than 300 ng/L

NEW HAMPSHIRE

Windham, NH Fire Station Combined PFOA/PFOS: (Senior Center: 96 ppt; Fire Department building: 112 ppt; Dunkin Donuts/Bodega: 100 ppt) Firefighting foam used at local fire station In addition see also: NH DES Oct 2, 2017 letter to all fire stations after 6 of 7 wells tested elevated for PFOA. https://www4.des.state.nh.us/nh-pfas-investigation/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Fire_Department_H20Sample.pdf

From Geoff Daly:

If you do not already have these NH Fire Stations with Well Contaminations from PFAS please include:-

· Kingston NH detected 140 PPT in their water wells around the station.

· The main NH Concord training center the East side of the Airport, the First site is as you enter where they train for Aircraft fires. Then at the Rear of the Main Building are several training areas near the Soucook River.

· Brentwood Fire Academy off Rte101 on North Road behind the Rockingham Jail, beyond the Water Works are three major wells over 2,000+ PPT

· Franklin NH main Fire Station.

· Windham Station on N. Lowell Rd and Fellows Rd.

· Bow NH has 6 Fire Stations where PFAS has been detected at Elevated levels. I believe there are several others out towards Keen and up near Lebanon airport area.

New York State

Suffolk County Firematics Training FacilityPFOS (<2 ppt — 2540 ppt), PFAS (<2 ppt — 133 ppt) PFHxS: 528 ppt, PFHpA: 137 ppt, PFNA: 252 ppt Firefighting foam used at Suffolk County Firematics Training Facility Firematics served as Suffolk County’s firefighting training facility since 1959 and used PFC-containing foam until May 2016, when chemicals in the foam were classified as hazardous substances by NYS. Hampton Bays Fire Station Combined PFOA/PFOS (as high as 85.8 ppt) Firefighting foam used at Fire Station “In September 2017, two public water supply wells were closed in Hampton Bays when PFCs were detected. The suspected culprit is fire fighting suppressant foam that contained PFCs. A two-acre site that is owned by the Hampton Bays Fire District is now listed as a “potential hazardous waste site”

https://pfasproject.com/yaphank-firematics-site-ny/

(added to list 12/13/18):

Stewart International Airport: and Stewart Air National Guard

https://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/remediation_hudson_pdf/newburghpfosangsmpltrptpart1.pdf

https://www.riverkeeper.org/blogs/docket/nine-months-later-pfos-pollution-stewart-air-national-guard-base-continues-unabated/

https://www.cityofnewburgh-ny.gov/home/news/city-of-newburgh-announces-a-federal-lawsuit-against-the-us-air-force-nys-airport

1/21/2019

https://www.newsday.com/long-island/broohaven-lab-contamination-1.25118134

Brookhaven Labs https://www.bnl.gov/stakeholder/docs/CAC/Final10-11-18-CAC-PFAS-Presentation.pdf

• Areas where firefighting foam was used • Airports • Regional fire training facilities • Local firehouses/substations? • PFAS detected in Long Island groundwater linked to firefighting foam. Examples: • Yaphank Fire Training Facility

Source of PFAS = Firefighting Foam Based upon review of available records and interviews with current long-term firefighters and retirees, identified eight locations where foam was stored or released: A. Trailer near Building 924 (1970) B. Area near Building 902 (1970) C. Former Bubble Chamber Experiment and Blockhouse Area (1973 [2 times], 1980) D. Former Firehouse (1966–1985) E. Current Firehouse (1986–2008)

• Results for western well field: • PFOS/PFOA concentrations up to 3,124 ng/L at the Current Firehouse • Other PFAS compounds were also detected •

• To date, installed 19 of the planned 32 temporary wells. Available results: o Former Firehouse ▪ PFOS/PFOA up to 5,371 ng/L

NORTH CAROLINA:

(added 12/13/18)

Piedmont Triad International Airport

https://www.greensboro.com/news/government/airport-area-residents-question-officials-about-possible-pfos-contamination-to/article_f28378a2-d932-5901-9b99-442ec05d0882.html

PFOS was heavily used in the airport area as a key ingredient in firefighting foams relied upon by PTI fire crews and other fire departments, both in training exercises and in fighting fires in the neighboring industrial area.

VERMONT:

https://vtdigger.org/2018/09/17/state-launches-effort-collect-toxic-foam-local-fire-departments/

WASHINGTON

Issaquah Fire Station; Tanker crash site PFOA (20–80 ppt; non-detect at tap). PFOS (600–2,200 ppt; non-detect at tap) PFBS: 69.5 ppt; PFHpA: 5.31 ppt; PFHxS: 47.3 ppt; PFNA: 22.1 ppt Firefighting foam used at Eastside Fire Rescue and firefighting foam sprayed during a tanker fire in 2002 Wisconsin Tyco-Ansul Fire Technology Center Marinette, Wisconsin Jan.22.2018: [Groundwater — combined PFOA/PFOS: ND-1,653 ppt], [well water — combined PFOA/PFOS: ND-690 ppt] June 2018: [Out of the 137 wells tested during winter 2017, 97 showed no contamination, 29 had PFAS below the EPA health advisory level of 70 ppt, and 11 had PFAS above the health advisory level. Tyco offered bottled water to homes that had their wells tested, and is still providing bottled water to 126 recipients. For the homes above the health advisory level, Tyco offered GAC water filtration systems to clean the water before use. Seven accepted the filters. In Spring of 2018, Tyco tested 129 wells, most of which were repeat tests but some of which were new. 71 showed no contamination, 23 showed PFAS below the health advisory level, and 1 showed above the advisory level.] AUSTRALIA: http://fbeu.net/2007/03/safety-first-3m-foam-banned-return-to-sender/

WISCONSIN

1/21/2019 this one is confusing. I’m not certain if it is one county and one mil airport fire department/training facility at one location.

https://wkow.com/news/2019/01/10/residents-concerned-about-chemicals-found-in-city-well/

http://mejo.us/dane-county-airport-burn-pit-contamination-began-in-the-1950s/

On December 9, 2018: Wisconsin State Journal published a story about PFAS.

On December 12, 2018: Dane County Airport Commission discussed the PFAS contamination at Truax for the first time (under the generic agenda item, “environmental matters update”). Three citizens, including me, attended. After giving a brief introduction about PFAS, Airport Director Kim Jones mentioned that after the June 18 potential RP letter was sent to the city, airport, and ANG (asking for burn pit investigations), “There were some meetings held, and the Guard agreed to conduct those additional studies” and “a letter was returned to the DNR, signed by the Guard, by Mike Kirchner who is the airport’s engineer, and by the Mayor, stating that the Guard would take on this responsibility.” Further, she noted that “on completion of those studies, we’ll all work cooperatively to resolve any of the issues that are identified.

On Jan. 2, 2019: At my request, Kim Jones sent me the letter she referred to.

What is going on?

The burn pit history, arrangements that National Guard Bureau will take over the investigations, and the City and County approval of this, raise many questions:

-Why is ANG taking over these investigations even though they don’t own the land?

-What did county and city officials do with the findings of the 1989 Truax Field investigative report, if anything? Why were these reports buried?

-Who was found to be responsible for the burn pit after DNR’s 1990 letter posing this question?

-Why was the Darwin burn pit area never remediated?

-Why was this site never regulated by DNR under Remediation and Redevelopment?

-Why was Truax Field never put on the Superfund National Priorities List?

-Why aren’t the many other toxic contaminants (besides PFAS) at the burn pits being assessed?

-Why won’t DNR put documents from these burn pit investigations onto the BRRTS site so the public can access them (as we were told more than once by government officials would happen)?

Are government entities covering for others or are they all protecting each other?

° Dane County owns the land in question.

° The military leases the land and is responsible for a significant portion of the contamination in many parts of Truax Field.

° The City of Madison once owned the land and is also responsible for some of the contamination over many decades.

° The County and City have authority through city and state regulations to require testing of contaminants that enter its stormwater system. Of course, the County also holds a stormwater permit jointly with the Air National Guard. Is this a conflict of interest?

° All these government entities have been discussing who was responsible for what and when, attempting to discern/limit liabilities. Does allowing the military take the lead on testing lead to limited or no liability for local government?

And the public — until now — has known nothing about this.

[1] This study of a military fire pit abandoned 20 years prior found total PFAS levels in the millions of parts-per-trillion (ppt) (the EPA’s “health advisory” level for PFAS is 70 ppt).

[2] See here and here and here — from Sharon Lerner’s excellent piece “The Military is Spending Millions of Dollars to Replace Toxic Firefighting Foam with Toxic Firefighting Foam.”

From this REPORT by Air National Guard / Truax Field:

https://cswab.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Truax-Air-National-Guard-Phase-1-PFAS-Inspection-Report-March-2018.pdf

8.1 PRL 1: Building 430 (Current Fire Station) 8.1.1 PRL 1 Soil Analytical Results Seven soil samples (including one duplicate) were collected and analyzed from three borings as described in Section 6.3.2: 01SB01 from 0.5–1.0 and 4.5 to 5.5 ft. bgs; 01SB02 from 0.5 to 1.0 and 4.5 to 5.5 ft. bgs; 01SB03 from 0.5 to 1.0 and 4.0 to 4.5 ft. bgs. Analytical results from soil samples indicate PFCs were detected above the laboratory reporting limit, with the shallow sample in 01SB01 exceeding HA criteria for PFOS. PFOS was detected at a concentration of 1.32 mg/kg and PFOA was detected at a concentration of 0.00241 mg/kg. Comparison of soil analytical results to applicable screening criteria are presented on Table 2. The soil boring locations showing detected compounds are depicted on Figure 4.

Safety First. 3M foam banned — return to sender

March 26, 2007

My January 16, 2019 Stakeholder Statement at MassDEP PFAS MRL Petition by Toxics Action Center and Conservation Law Fund

Good Morning,

I’m Diane Cotter, and I advocate for firefighters PFAS exposures.

Regarding AFFF: October 2nd, 2017 the NH DES sent every fire station in the NH a letter advising them to test their water, as recent findings showed 6 of 7 stations tested elevated for PFOA/PFOS. This was an accidental discovery brought on by construction next to a fire station. Soil samples required by nearby building construction discovered high levels of PFOA at the firehouse.

https://www4.des.state.nh.us/nh-pfas-investigation/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Fire_Department_H20Sample.pdf

There are 58,000 fire stations in the USA. It would be wise to test every station.

Yesterday I was told by a 30 year Massachusetts firefighter that years ago they would wash the walls of the station with AFFF, wash their turnout gear, their trucks, and bring their gear home for wives to wash. Then, they would discharg their tanks in the nearby reservoir.

We applaud the Mass initiative to collect old AFFF to be disposed of properly and ask that this program continue.

Today I’m here to talk to you about the staggering amounts of PFAS used in the manufacturing of firefighter turnout gear. Textiles make up over 30% of the fluoro-industry footprint.

It was not the manufacturers of our gear, or NFPA, OSHA, CDC, EPA, or ACC that made this discovery and notified us. It was the diagnosis of my firefighter husband’s career ending cancer that led to this discovery.

Searching for information on chemicals used in manufacturing of gear was hopeless. Manufacturers cited propriety CBI. These same manufactures are immersed in every aspect of firefighter cancer research, prevention, and outreach. But they will not discuss the chemicals used in the gear.

I went to the extreme length of purchasing ‘new never-worn’ turnout gear, with the hopes of finding a scientist who would be willing to test it for us. And I found him, I found Profess of Physics, Graham Peaslee of Notre Dame University. He relayed the initial fluorine results were so high in fluorine the amounts had to be read in ‘volume’ not the usual ppb/ppm. Further testing would reveal PFOA thousands of times higher than the new MRL, as well as PFNA, PFDA, and PFHxS…

PFOA causes testicular cancer. PFOA is the number one cancer in the fire service. DuPont is a manufacturer of our gear. DuPont knew in 1992 PFOA causes testicular cancer. DuPont has never told us about the PFOA in turnout gear.

Professor Peaslee is now testing 20 years worth of new, never-worn turnout gear. We are funding this research through private fundraising, car washes, bake-sales, and grants given by Boston’s own Last Call Foundation Honoring Fire Fighter Michael Kennedy, as well as Fire Maul Tools of Chicago. Professor Peaslee is working pro-bono. It’s the commercial testing that is extremely expensive.

Please allow me to read this brief explanation of concern from the Professor:

Question:

Professor, I’ve requested to give a oral statement tomorrow at this event and wish to shed light on the amount of long chain PFAS in the PPE degrading in landfills for years…

Answer:

Diane, we don’t know how much of the PFAS coating in a jacket will degrade into PFOA, and how much will degrade into other PFAS unfortunately. I do know the timescale on textiles like turnout gear will be on the order of a decade or two before it all decomposes. And I do know from literature (attached) that the majority of clothing will decay in PFOA compared to other PFAS…maybe 50–60% will end up as PFOA. This leads to a scary amount of PFOA in a typical landfill leachate.

So to get you something more concrete, I went back to the measurement of the new turnout gears, that had 116 ppm of PFOA that was readily available from the material on the jacket. I am guessing 95+ % remain on the jacket, but this was what would come off immediately if you soaked the jacket in water for a couple days. I went to the internet and looked up how much material is in a men’s jacket, and it is about 3 yards x 45 in wide fabric or 1620 inches squared. Then I weighed a piece of jacket fabric in my lab from Boston FD, and I calculate about 730 g of fabric per jacket. (This is under 2 lbs, which seem a little light, but there is a lt of reinforced cloth and buckles on a typical jacket that probaly gives it a few more pounds, but no more PFAS.) If there are 730 g of fabric per jacket and there are 116 ppm PFOA per gram, then you end with about 85 mg of free PFOA per jacket. This may not seem like much, but if you tossed two jackets into an Olympic-sized swimming pool (with 660,000 gallons of water), this amount of PFOA would exceed the 70 parts per trillion EPA standard for drinking water! This is without decaying in a landfill 20 years. Imagining pants are about the same as a jacket, that means one set of new turnout gear tossed into water would produce enough waste PFOA to contaminate a full-sized swimming pool. Then if you let it decay in a landfill for 10–20 years you would probably get enough PFOA to contaminate 100 times that much…but the exact ratio of PFOA to to other PFAS isn’t known in decaying fabric, and the total amount of fluorochemicals applied to the clothing isn’t known exactly by anybody but manufacturers, so it will be hard to say whether it is 100x or 500x. But the bottom line is that these heavily treated textiles will contaminate 300,000 gallons of water per item readily, and maybe 100 times that over a couple of decades in the landfill…which is a lot of water.

There are some assumptions in here…but this is why I am concerned about the end-of-life disposal of turnout gear…like carpets they represent a significant source of PFAS for a few generations to come.

…………………………………

From Diane;

A few comments to consider. Gear is replaced every 5 to 10 years. The NFPA standard is every 10 years (with more frequent use some will be replaced sooner). NFPA annex recommends 2 sets of gear for every firefighter. There are 1.5 million firefighters in the USA. There are approximately 15,000 firefighters in Massachusetts. Our best guess is the chemicals began their use in turnout gear in the 80’s or 90’s. We’re not exactly sure.

We are now told by our manufactures that C6 is now used in place of C8. But the manufacturers didn’t tell us that PFOA was in our old gear to begin with. We have a trust issue here.

For the protection of the health of the citizens of the Commonwealth, and for the protection of the citizens who may be forced to pick up remediation costs, we ask that PFAS be classed as a group.

Thank you.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kztii2V3g2w&feature=share&fbclid=IwAR190GP3SI3uK03Wa_xmYPOngkCZoa4NztpUPRvQiCHAVJB9ntxRt2O-Bog&app=desktop

Review of the fate and transformation of per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFASs) in landfills…
Environ Pollut. 2018 Apr;235:74-84. doi: 10.1016/j.envpol.2017.12.030. Epub 2017 Dec 21. Reviewwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27095439

Dear Mr Wheeler ....

Dear Mr Wheeler…………

Senator Sanders, If you will be so kind as to address the issue of omission, lies, and betrayal from AFFF and PPE manufacturers relating to PFAS poisioning of the nation’s fire service.

In January of 2018, just one year ago, we discovered the devastating news the the fire service has been coated in PFOA and other long chain PFAS chemicals for decades.

The chemicals are used to make ‘turnout gear’ water resistant. This news was not given to us by the manufactures who make our gear; DuPont Safety Solutions, Honeywell, W.L. Gore, Globe, Lion, etc.

Nor was the information of the amounts of PFOA given to us by NFPA the organization charged with the oversight of safety standards for 1.4 million fire fighters. The same manufacturers listed above, DuPont, Honeywell, Gore, Globe, Lion, all sit on NFPA 1971 the standard for ‘Structural Fire Fighting’ personal protection ensembles. They have been sitting on NFPA for decades. Deciding everything from the width of reflective tape to the balance of a helmet.

However, they were under no legal obligation to disclose the PFOA used in our turnout gear was there.

And it was there in staggering amounts. Thousands of times over the new EPA MRL for PFOA.

Neither the EPA, or NIOSH via CDC/ATSDR, considered the fire service, even though there are 58,000 fire stations in this country that have stored, trained, or used 3M’s AFFF. For that matter, 3M also sat on NFPA Foam 11. They too knew their AFFF was causing adverse health effects in their lab animals.

Still, the manufacturers that shape the outcome of their own pockets, by immersing themselves in NFPA, have zero obligation to discuss any chemicals known to be endocrine disrupting.

In 2017, a 2001 ‘personal note’ from a NFPA ‘11’ Foam committee member made the news due to the disgraceful act of hiding the knowledge of AFFF being a …. ‘death sentence’… while this person was a sitting member of NFPA. The manufactures said nothing to the front line. And firefighters continued to inhale, ingest, swim, wash,spray AFFF like it was dish detergent:

http://www.theintell.com/news/20170609/dangers-of-firefighting-foam-discussed-in-2001-document-shows?fbclid=IwAR2h8vPzZRmrACHZOCp5OahCoFP_93Tb-CaGE3D9-g5eP8yvvZwpyWAYjvo

DuPont, the maker of Kevlar and Nomex, coats our turnout gear with ‘Teflon coatings’. We do not know how much. We do not know the chemical breakdown of their mixtures.

Only DuPont does. They will not disclose this information, When asked they advise that ‘PFOA’ was never used. But, it may be present in ‘trace amounts’ as a by product of production. The PPE industry is a 5 billion dollar a year industry. That includes outfitting the military as well.

These same manufactures that are represented by the lobbyists ACC and FFFC are under no obligation to ensure the safe outcome of first responders and citizens. However, they have found a very convenient place to hide our cancers… in toxic smoke. Never once mentioning their knowledge of their own lab tests where animals died from PFOA and PFOS.

The amounts in the 2004 turnout gear are hardly ‘trace amounts’.

There is no ‘limit’ to how much of these chemicals can go into our turnout gear.

There is no ‘PFAS warning label’. Only the state of Washington lobbied for and now has that protection. Specific to firefighter turnout gear. Just this past year. See SB 6413. Brought about by Washington State Council of Fire Fighters and Toxic Free Future. The fire service had to protect itself and our citizens as the EPA refuses to protect us.

We have been paying for gear that may in fact be harming us.

So then, how did we find out about our gear?

My husband. Paul Cotter. A 27 year veteran of the Worcester Mass fire department. He was diagnosed with prostate cancer.

My research led to the ‘chemical coatings’ of turnout gear.. I could find no answers. I went to the extreme length of purchasing a set of new never worn gear and pleaded with the science community to help. Thankfully,Professor of Physics Graham Peaslee of Notre Dame offered his services.

What you see attached are his results.. please… keep in mind, that his testing could only recover “ a fraction of the potential “ of the chemicals he found.

Please see this September 2018 coverage of our issue by Karen Hensel

of NBC Boston:

https://www.nbcboston.com/news/local/Chemical-in-Firefighter-Turnout-Gear-Eyed-As-Potential-Cancer-Agent-494194661.html

Currently, Professor Peaslee is testing 20 years worth of new never worn turnout gear.

PFOA causes testicular cancer. Testicular cancer is the number one cancerin the fire service. DuPont sponsors all of our firefighter cancer research,is present at all of our firefighter cancer symposiums, and preaches firefighter cancer prevention relentlessly to us. Not once did they disclose the PFOA in our gear. Instead, they focus on the products of combustion aka toxic smoke.

They did not have to. It is not regulated.

Our turnout gear has been degrading in fire stations around the country for decades.

On September 5, 2017, Environmental Attorney Robert Bilott sent this 195 page letter to EPA, CDC/ATSDR, US Attorney Jeff Sessions, demanding testing and studies for first responders. Please read his letter for the reasons why he wants first responders studied, his offer to help, and his unprecedented efforts in the PFAS catastrophe.

https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3988104-Firefighter-Letter.html

The fire service is so over looked, that even the CDC/ATSDR would not have us in the national PFAS Study awarded to PEASE AFB. It is assumed that firefighters cancer comes from ‘products of combustion’, and a complex fieldof chemicals. That is true, but now we know it’s in our gear. And the chemical giants made every effort to hide it. DuPont and Gore were warned in 2005 to notify the end user that the workers in the plant making coatings and water repellents were seeing significant PFOA related health concerns. (attached DuPont Shareholders Right to Know More)

First responders were excluded from the PEASE AFB PFAS Study. Because wewere occupationally exposed. Outrageous. Here again, Robert Bilott sends a 47 page letter to the CDC/ATSDR(attached).

Unlike the EU, we have no limits for PFOA in textiles. Or PFAS for that matter.

We can’t even agree on water mrl’s.

Senator Sanders, in December 2018, yourself, along with Senators Shaheen, Murkowski, Warren, Hassan and 20 other bipartisan members signed a letter to CDC/ATASDR seeking the addition of the first responders into the CDC/ATSDR study. (attached).

On January 3, 2019, Congressmen Jim McGovern and Brian Fitzpatrick addressed CDC/ATSDR with the same bipartisan letter. Seeking the first responders of this nation be included in that study.

I’ve also included a 40 year old document from NIOSH on the concerns for occupationally exposed workers in contact with PFAS. We have come not onestep further in fifty years to regulating these chemicals, to protecting workers, their families, and this planet.

Senator Sanders, you are one of the original signers of the letters to CDC.

We cannot tell you how we appreciate and respect you for that.

Please ask Mr Wheeler when, when will he protect the first responders of this nation who have been immersed in AFFF for 60 plus years. Why has there been no effort of the EPA to clean test the water and soil of 58,000 fire stations in this nation as has been done in the state of New Hampshire? When will he put PFAS limits in textiles, protecting not only first responders, but men women and children?

Will he classify PFAS as a group? We cannot wait 40 more years to find out the C6 now used as our coatings in turnout gear has contributed to our cancers.

https://www4.des.state.nh.us/nh-pfas-investigation/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Fire_Department_H20Sample.pdf

Sincerely,

Diane Cotter

Your Turnout Gear and PFOA

Rindge NH

Statement read at June 2018 - EPA PFAS Community Engagement Agenda, Exeter NH

My name is Diane Cotter, my husband is a 28 year veteran of the Worcester MA fire department. On September 19, 2014 my husband was promoted to Lieutenant, after 28 years on Rescue 1. It was not a decision he wanted to make, but one that would better our family. When he learnt he passed the Lt exam he told me his heart sank. One month later, on November 15th my husband’s career was over. He was diagnosed with cancer. Cancer is rampant in the fire service. In the fire service we have been groomed by leading manufacturers that our cancers are the result of products of combustion, diesel exhausts, exposure to ‘soiled gear’.

While these exposures are a fact, they left out something. That is the chemicals used to make our turnout gear contain staggering amounts of the PFAS chemicals. When I say staggering, I mean at a minimum, 14,000 times the new MRL for PFOA. DuPont is one of the makers of the fabrics used in the outer shell portion of turnout gear. For years they have been immersed in every aspect of FF cancer, from funding ff cancer research, guiding student thesis’s on ‘soiled gear’ to funding FF cancer symposiums, advising us over and over to wash our gear etc., They deny ever using PFOA. They use slick language to stating ‘they never have used PFOA in the process of making PPE’. They tell us if it is there, it will be in ‘trace amounts, as a by-product of production’. Those words play on the ignorance of the fire service who does not yet understand that the PFAS chemicals used then degraded to form PFOA. And who now believe ‘trace amounts’ are not enough to harm us. The ‘short chain PFAS chemicals used now are of concern as well, but we can’t find out what is used. That’s proprietary.

Turnout Gear literature in the fire service will show our manufacturers discussing their gear is the best possible prevention method for particle penetration, water resistance, cancer prevention. In the fire service it’s all about cancer prevention. It’s all we talk about, but, we can’t discuss the chemicals that our gear is made from. Any inquiries will receive the standard ‘proprietary’ information reply.

In January 2018, my husband and I received results from our own independent study as performed by Professor of Physics, Graham Peaslee of Notre Dame University, that confirmed our suspicion that long chain PFCs were found in new, never-worn turnout gear. What we weren’t prepared for, was the amounts used. That these chemicals have been used for almost 20 years in the fire service, and they have been degrading in our stations for that long.

On June 25th, at the first in the nation EPA Panel on PFAS Community Engagement, after the release of the much contested PFAS Toxicological Profile, the group Testing for Pease and Toxics Action Center hosted a community event. I gave the following statement:

Thank you Testing for Pease and Toxics Action Center for the opportunity to share the plight of this nation’s fire service in this catastrophe. Thank you EPA and CDC for hearing us.

After placing the 2004 gear on the stage (it was placed in a see through bag as I was concerned about the amounts of PFOA/PFNA):

Thank you Organizers and EPA Panel Members for allowing me this opportunity to speak.My name is Diane Cotter, I am here with my husband, Lt Paul Cotter, retired, 28 year veteran, Worcester Fire Department . And cancer survivor.

My community is the 1.3 million firefighters in this nation who have been completely overlooked in this PFAS catastrophe. America’s firefighters have been on the front line of PFAS exposure since 1983 using it in AFFF, being sprayed in our faces, wading in it, having turnout gear soaked in it, and exposing our families to it after bringing gear home.

We were not aware how toxic this substance was. This turnout gear I have is from 2004, it is new and never worn or ‘contaminated’ as the fire service would say. Jan of 2018 our grassroots effort acquired Professor of Physics Graham Peaselee, of Notre Dame Univ to test it for PFAS content. Just the ‘fraction of the potential’ that is in this gear tested at 157 ppb PFOA and 257 PFNA.

THAT IS 14, 000 times the newly set recommended limit of PFOA.

Turnout gear has been impregnated with PFOA since 1999 (at least) to meet NFPA water repellent STANDARDS. We were never made aware. We do not know how much. Only our gear manufacturers have that information. We sweat in this gear, our body temperature rises and our skin absorbs these toxins. We start our careers in our child bearing years. PFOA and PFOS are designated by California Prop65 as causing ‘reproductive cancers’.

In 2006 the European Chemical Agency (ECHA) notified gear manufacturers they would be restricting PFOA in ‘textiles’. One of those textiles is firefighter PPE. By 2012 PFOA was designated a Substance of Very High Concern there. Gear manufacturers were made aware of the decision to restrict the amount of PFOA in turnout gear to 25ppb and ‘precursors’ to 1 ppm. To date they have not advised the US of this issue. While the manufacturers are discussing and teaching about the issue in Europe, they have not mentioned it here.

They minimized the issue when it came up recently in a firefighting trade magazine published by ‘Station Pride’ titled ‘The Real Cancer in Your Gear’. https://station-pride.com/2017/03/28/the-real-cancer-in-your-gear/ We are in a particularly high risk exposure setting as our gear has been degrading in our fire stations where we work, eat, sleep, since 1999. The coating degrades in UV lighting, in many stations our gear is stored in open lighting next to apparatus in bays. Paul’s station had 80 sets of gear rotating through his station in one week. The gear is designed to be used for 10 years. Over 20 years we have had thousands of sets releasing particles of PFOA into our stations.

The new short chain coatings are also a concern. NH State Rep and Enviro Scientist Mindi Messmer wrote an article on this issue titled Firefighter Cancer Quadfecta. https://www.firefighternation.com/…/firefighter-cancer-quad… ; From trade magazine FireFighter Nation: “The replacements, termed “short chain PFCs” were sported as better for the environment and public health. However, scientific studies conducted in laboratory animals indicate that the short chain replacements could be more toxic to humans since they accumulate longer in organs than the long chain legacy compounds. This may be the cause of cancer incidence in younger firefighters”. “I have been advocating for a national health study specifically focused on firefighters to assess the health outcomes because they are highly exposed. It is often difficult to tie causation with cancer or other chronic diseases. Focusing on the highly exposed populations is more likely to carefully evaluate possible negative health outcomes for exposures to PFCs. This should include, at a minimum, thorough cancer screening and annual serum PFC monitoring of firefighters to provide longitudinal data to assess health outcomes (see Table 2). It is not enough to have a cancer registry, we have to prevent cancer by taking proactive steps to identify and prevent exposures in while firefighting, in fire stations, and in the turnout gear before they make firefighters sick.” Mindi Messmer

To date there has not been a PFAS dust study done in our stations. Yet, biomonitoring has shown firefighters PFOA serum tested in ranges from 243 ng/mL to 423 ng/mL from a ‘yet unknown source’. The ‘DuPont Water Works’ plant workers were considered high at 32 ng/mL.

Adding to this concern is the October 2, 2017 NH DES letter to every fire station in NH that of 6 of 7 New Hampshire fire stations water wells tested at ‘elevated’ levels of PFAS. https://www4.des.state.nh.us/…/Fire_Department_H20Sample.pdf

In 1992 DuPont’s own scientist learned their PFOA caused testicular cancer. Testicular cancer is the number one cancer in the fire service. . DuPont is a manufacturer of our gear. They have yet to tell us about this. They are immersed in every aspect of fire fighter cancer research, and teaching prevention methods. In 2006 they notified shareholders that ‘any attempt to regulate PFOA would impact their bottom line’. They never shared that with us either. In 2005 the United Steelworkers Union advised Gore also a turnout gear manufacturer, and DuPont, to notify the end user of the harmful effects of PFOA. Neither did. https://www.cleanlink.com/…/Steelworkers-Union-Warn-of-Harm…

On September 5, 2017, Environmental Attorney Robert Bilott, C8 Science panel’s Dr Paul A Brooks, and Fire Chief Jeff Hermes have demanded testing and studies of the EPA, CDC/ATSDR, and US Attorney General on behalf of all first responders US due to their exposure from foam and gear. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3988104-Firefighter-Letter.html

With NO regulations for these chemicals, manufacturers are under NO obligation to tell us what we are wearing, or spraying. They defiantly refuse to give us that information citing ‘proprietary information’. They have even lobbied for and win the right to NOT put warning labels in our turnout gear. Our manufacturers sit on NFPA committees deciding safety standards of gear, from the balance of a helmet to the width of reflective tape. but are under no obligation to advise of the chemicals in our gear. They never did. Not once. The newly released PFAS study mentions FF occupational and high risk of exposure numerous times.

Yet the fire service has been omitted from the multi million dollar PFAS Study award. We respectfully ask Senator Shaheen and Massachusetts Senator Elizabeth Warren to immediately add this nations fire fighters to the PFAS Registry along with the already chosen active military and veterans.

The EPA and NIOSH have been kicking this issue of occupational exposure and setting limits down the road for over 40 years. Last week I shared a 1977 NIOSH report titled “ Criteria for a recommended standard — occupational exposure to DECOMPOSITION PRODUCTS of FLUOROCARBON POLYMERS” . Here in 2018 we are seeing the same thing.

(see attached cdc_19394_DS1)

Under both Democratic and Republican leadership the EPA and CDC have been a catastrophic failure to the fire service. Hasn’t anyone wondered about the firefighter they see covered head to toe in A-tripleF?

After 40 years of indecisiveness, the fire service took matters into its own hands. Washington State Council of Fire Fighters and Toxic Free Future passed SB 6413 limiting the use PFAS in AFFF and requiring labels be added advising the wearer of PFAS exposure in turnout gear. The Professional Fire Fighters of Massachusetts, in support with Toxics Action Center, has voted unanimously last week to make PFAS legislation a priority.

The fire service can do this state to state to protect ourselves and fellow citizens. And we WILL get it done. But isn’t that your job?

Sincerely,

Diane Cotter

Please see our social media page Your Turnout Gear and PFOA for updates on this issue.

7/25/18 reply of Commander Kenney Fent of the CDC NIOSH with my response of 7/26/18 below:

7/25/18 reply of Commander Kenney Fent of the CDC NIOSH with my response of 7/26/18 below:

7/25/18 reply of Commander Kenney Fent of the CDC NIOSH with my response of 7/26/18 below:

Diane Cotter

Dear Diane Cotter:

Thank you for your email regarding perfluoroalkyl substance (PFAS) contamination in the fire service for career, volunteer, wildland, and military first responders. The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) is familiar with this concern and actively engaged in research on occupational exposure to these compounds and other persistent organic compounds. NIOSH is also part of a large network of federal agencies, including the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Department of Defense (DOD) among others, evaluating the exposure and risk of a number of PFAS compounds including GenX chemicals (also a member of the PFAS family). NIOSH regularly communicates our applicable research findings to these other federal agencies with the goal of expanding our collective understanding of human exposure to PFAS and other persistent organic compounds.

As you may know, PFAS were used in multiple products in the United States, such as stain resistant and water repellant coatings on fabrics and textiles, including those used in the fire service. PFAS were also used as surfactants in the aqueous film forming foams (AFFF) that fire departments may use to suppress industrial fires, chemical fires, or other fires that are difficult to suppress with water. Because of the environmental persistence, bioaccumulation, and toxicity concerns, many PFAS compounds have been phased out in the United States. In many cases, shorter-chain fluorinated compounds are being used as replacements in the aforementioned products. These replacements are much less persistent in the environment and are typically short-lived in the human body. However, further toxicity research on these replacement chemicals is needed. Because AFFF foams have long shelf lives, some departments may still have legacy PFAS-containing AFFF foams in stock.

NIOSH is currently engaged in ongoing research studies to examine PFAS exposure in the fire service. In a 2015 collaborative study with the University of Illinois, where firefighters suppressed controlled residential fires, NIOSH collected blood from 36 U.S. firefighters for the analysis of PFAS compounds. The results from this study may provide an indication of the biological levels of PFAS among a select group of firefighters. Data from this study are still undergoing analysis, but we hope to publish the findings within the next year.

NIOSH is also working with the Universities of Miami and Arizona on a prospective firefighter cancer cohort study. As part of this study, samples of firefighter participants’ blood are being collected for PFAS analysis. One goal is to expand this cohort to include firefighters who are more likely to use or have used PFAS-containing AFFF foams, such as industrial firefighter trainers. This study is still in the early phases, so it will take some time to publish the results.

Page 2 — Diane Carter

NIOSH is also considering other studies focused on occupational exposure to PFAS, including GenX chemicals.

Your email raised concern regarding the carcinogenicity of PFAS compounds. There are many risk factors for cancer, including diet, physical fitness, and chemical exposures. Firefighters may be exposed to numerous combustion byproducts that are known human carcinogens, including polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), benzene, formaldehyde, and vinyl chloride. Much of the research at NIOSH has focused on these known human carcinogens. It is currently unknown how PFAS-containing AFFF foams and firefighting textiles contributed to the systemic levels of PFAS in firefighters, and further, how these exposures then contributed to health outcomes. While studies certainly indicate that firefighters have an increased risk of certain types of cancer, linking these cancers to specific exposures is very difficult.

Generally, scientists can only provide evidence for causality, but can rarely provide proof of causality. It becomes even more difficult to provide evidence of causality when the exposure has changed substantially over time. Because some PFAS compounds have been phased out of a variety of products, including recent turnout gear ensembles, firefighters’ exposures may also be different today than decades ago. This is further compounded by the fact that firefighters could have PFAS exposures from combustion sources (depending on what is burning) or be exposed outside the workplace (depending on furniture, carpeting, etc. used in the home). Despite these complexities, we are fully dedicated to understanding firefighters’ exposures to all chemicals and identifying ways of minimizing those exposures and any related health effects.

Thank you for your concern and outreach on this important topic. Please be on the lookout for informative articles on firefighters’ exposures to PFAS and other persistent organic compounds as we publish findings from our research over the next few years. These results will also be shared broadly with the U.S. fire service organizations.

Sincerely,

Kenneth Fent, PhD, CIH

Research Industrial Hygienist

CDR, U.S. Public Health Service

National Institute for Occupational Safety

Dear Kenny,

With all due respect, this response does nothing to support a national protocol for the fire service. Every single fire station in the nation that trained with AFFF is at risk.

Every single fire station in the nation that houses PPE is at risk.

Every single fire fighter should have serum tested. Every single fire fighter should be included in the National PFAS Register.

I’m at a loss to understand why the alarm is not being sounded for the fire service here in the USA as it is in Australia, where their union has ordered the serum testing for all fire fighters?

Or why we are not conducting symposiums as is done in Europe to educate the fire service on the chemicals used in the making of theprotective ensembles. And the end of life disposal methods. We must have limits of PFAS chemicals in our gear now. Not in the future. As has been done in the EU by the demands of ECHA 25ppb PFOA in PPE and 1ppm precursors.

We must have labeling in our gear now on a national scale as has been instituted in Washington State. Notifying the fire fighter that the garment contains PFAS chemicals which are known to be endocrine disruptions.

The 385 page ECHA background document on PFAS goes into great discussion about fire fighters. Their occupational exposure from the gear via routes of exposure; dermal, ingestion, inhalation. From the gear.

These are all protocols we must provide now. Not in the future. You are the most respected man in the fire service Kenny. You and I have spoken on the phone about this issue. We spoke about the events in Europe and I sent you all of the material on their events.

This is not enough. We must have a plan now. Today. We know the chemicals are in the gear. The new PFAS may be even worse. We know they live in fire stations that have had gear degrading for decades. We know in the 80’s, 90’s, the fire service drilled using AFFF. If they drilled with AFFF in their own yards, they ARE at risk for water / soil contamination.

We need a national plan for the fire service. The testing and studies are wonderful and needed. But this is not a plan Kenny. We know they are occupational exposed. The new CDC PFAS Toxicological Profile states it.

We need a national fire service PFAS protocol.

Where do we turn now? If CDC is not going to do this? Who will put

this national project together?

Sincerely,

Diane Cotter

p.s. The ‘NIOSH’ photo used in the article is from this 1977 report:

https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/77-193/default.html

Statement and Question for Senator Markey at Senate PFAS Hearing please

While the focus of PFAS is currently on water affected communities, this nation’s fire service have been omitted from the conversation,we have no seat at the table, and have been omitted from the 100 million dollar PFAS study awarded to military communities, due to occupational exposure. We have had to hold bake sales and car washes to fund our own ‘PFAS turnout gear studies’ along with a large grant from Last Call Foundation of Boston. These studies will prove what PFAS chemicals are in our turnout gear ranging a span of the last 20 years. We had to procure new, never-worn gear via a grass roots efforts as the makers of our gear, who sit on every aspect of firefighter cancer prevention, refuse to discuss the chemical contents with us. Citing CBI.

This gear is degrading in our fire stations. This gear is degrading in our landfills. See the attached statement from Professor Graham Peaslee I read at the CLF and Toxics Action Center’s Petition for Rule-making to Establish a Treatment Technique Drinking Water Standard for Per-and-Polyfluoroalkyl Substances on January 16, 2018 at Boston DES.

While we focus on the astounding number of PFAS contamination sites, withvarying levels of MRL for PFOA or PFOS from state to state, I’d like you toplease notice the fire fighter who is wearing turnout gear made with PFAS in amounts so staggering it is difficult to comprehend. The attached independent test results performed by nuclear physicist Professor Graham Peaslee of Notre Dame University and released in January 2018, were to test for PFAS in a set of 2004 new, never-worn turnout gear. This gear was purchased by myself, a housewife, who’s firefighter husband suffered a career ending cancer.

No turnout gear manufacturer or government agency stepped in to help us. In fact, the turnout gear manufacturers all vehemently defend that the gear is not made with PFOA. We will soon see if that is true when the results of 20 years worth of turnout gear are published by Professor Peaslee in the next 30 days.

In addition to the PFAS laden turnout gear, we have 58,000 fire stations going unchecked for well-water contamination. Only the state of New Hampshire has sent a ‘warning’ letter to it’s fire stations (attached). However, I maintain a list of ‘fire stations’ who are reporting elevated levels of PFOA in well water. These are not ‘military’ sites. These are municipal and rural fire stations.If the government is tracking these ‘civilian’ fire stations we do not know. It is my belief there is no such tracking taking place.

We have been omitted from the entire PFAS conversation. Is that because 65% of this nation’s fire service will suffer a cancer diagnosis previously thought to be only from Products of Combustion? Quite possibly, it may not be Products of Combustion. Quite possibly, it is the Products of Deception.

I wish to ask Senator Markey ; “Why has the nation forsaken it’s bravest?”

Sincerely,

Diane Cotter

Rindge NH, formerly 58 year resident of Worcester County, MA.

How the EPA allowed DuPont to Poison the Fire Service

EPA and the ‘pinky swear’

In 2005 DuPont formed a statement about findings from the ERB (Epidemiology Review Board re PFOA )from which the scholars of this board objected to DuPont’s formed statement. The scholars were distinguished physicians from independent academic halls. Read their objections here:

https://static.ewg.org/files/ERB_February2005.pdf?_ga=2.199100461.368405263.1553087875-1279721342.1548095273

The details of the tasks of the ERB committee can be found here in this 2008 EWG article:

https://www.ewg.org/research/credibility-gap-toxic-chemicals-food-packaging-and-duponts-greenwashing/dupont-claims-odds?fbclid=IwAR1XEDqyumdoEsg_vS6MZn-ZVgHupsgMgmrXTz605b2MTpQWzt6wtf7pEoI

In February 2006, DuPont’s Susan Stalnecker (DuPont VP and Treasurer sent this ‘urgent’ email to DuPont people regarding ‘scripting’ she wished to convey to the EPA. https://www.industrydocumentslibrary.ucsf.edu/chemical/docs/?fbclid=IwAR19PD3Y5XpbFATkScapovzjsys2X4rMzp38y4KgZI_aOQbKW8M5pa2Bjxg#id=jppw0228

This concerns me gravely. It states she will be asking ‘Chad’ to reach out to ‘Steve Johnson’.

Steve Johnson was Administrator of the EPA from 2005 to 2009.

The familiarity of a DuPont executive to send an urgent letter to advise the EPA what to say about PFOA is astonishing. If the EPA did heed the script I do not know.

At the same time, in 2006, these DuPont Comments in Response to Proposition 65 give their perspective on why PFOA should not be designated the Prop 65 label.

Remember, in 2005, DuPont was aware of the health concerns of the scholars of the ERB Committee.

DuPont’s Prop 65 statement of 2006 is very concerning to me.

https://oehha.ca.gov/media/downloads/proposition-65/presentation/pfoapresentationall121206.pdf?fbclid=IwAR1MSIp0V6hUrYFv3Y8MRjVyscyPw7EH5RggKcTVNhLc-4nyVwsOT7-jBD8

‘THE PINKY SWEAR OF 2006 ‘

Why did EPA launch the PFOA Stewardship Program? https://www.epa.gov/assessing-and-managing-chemicals-under-tsca/fact-sheet-20102015-pfoa-stewardship-program

EPA launched the PFOA Stewardship Program in January 2006because of concerns about the impact of PFOA and long-chain PFASs on human health and the environment, including concerns about their persistence, presence in the environment and in the blood of the general U.S. population, long half-life in people, and developmental and other adverse effects in laboratory animals.

Well looky here… look who wrote this letter to EPA !!! Gosh darn it lol !! If it isn’t Susan Stalnecker !!! January 25, 2006 :

https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/dupontresponse.pdf

(oh silly trace amounts… now we get it…. trace amounts lol !!!) PFOA is found in trace amounts in some fluorotelomer products as an unintended byproduct of the manufacturing process.

You see the problem here. In January 2006 Susan Stalnecker was writing the pinky swear letter to EPA promising DuPont would behave. In February of 2006, not even a month later, Susan Stalnecker sounds the alarm to contact

EPA…. to tell them what to say about PFOA…. and… at the same time, as fingers are crossed behind their back in pinky swear to EPA, DuPont tells Cali not to put PFOA in Prop 65 CAUSE THERE ARE NO STUDIES… but there were studies… http://www.fluoridealert.org/wp-content/pesticides/effect.pfos.class.timeline.htm)..

Is it me? Asking for 1.4 million friends who are wearing ‘trace amounts’ of PFOA.

dc

Environmental Attorney Robert Bilott is fighting for all first responders in this PFAS mess. Get to know him here:

Environmental Attorney Robert Bilott is fighting for all first responders in this PFAS mess. Get to know him here:

Environmental Attorney Robert Bilott is fighting for all first responders in this PFAS mess. Get to know him here:

In the event you don’t know who Environmental Attorney Robert Bilott is you’ll want to check out these links. He’s been fighting for the fire service for testing and studies for over two years. Like Professor Peaslee, he’s another outsider. You wouldn’t recognize his name.

But the people affected by PFAS in their water sure know him..

Attorney Bilott’s background in this mess began 20 years ago: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/10/magazine/the-lawyer-who-became-duponts-worst-nightmare.html

Huffington Post article by Mariah Blake :

https://highline.huffingtonpost.com/articles/en/welcome-to-beautiful-parkersburg/

Series on the C8 issue by Sharon Lerner:

https://theintercept.com/2015/08/20/teflon-toxin-dupont-slipped-past-epa/

Callie Lyons, Author of ‘Stain-resistant, Nonstick, Waterproof, and Lethal C8:

https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=125220764163032&id=105786326120125

As a outcome of the case against DuPont, DuPont and the plaintiff’s agreed to abide by the studies and outcome of The C8 Science Panel. The C8 Science Panel was tasted with the study of 70,000 residents of the contaminated area in Parkersburg, WV. Dr Paul A Brooks was tasked with overseeing and monitoring results and outcomes.

http://www.c8sciencepanel.org/

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3855507/

https://www.ewg.org/research/poisoned-legacy/c8-science-panel

Now that you have a little background on who Robert Bilott is… This is what he has done for the last two years for the fire service.

September 5, 2017. Attorney Bilott sends 195 page letter to EPA, CDC/ATSDR, US Attorney General (then) Jeff Sessions. He, along with Fire Chief Jeffrey Hermes, and C8 Science Panel member Dr Paul Brooks, are demanding ‘PFAS testing and studies for first responders’ due to your occupational exposure of AFFF and PPE.

https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3988104-Firefighter-Letter.html

The denials from manufactures began immediately. The wanted to remind us that your cancers come from combustion. Not one offered to test or disclose their chemicals. They did tell us the new ‘C6’ chemistry is ‘ proven safe’ …

https://www.dispatch.com/news/20171029/firefighters-gear-may-be-hazardous

https://www.firerescue1.com/cancer/articles/348762018-Lawyer-says-firefighter-gear-could-be-hazardous/

“For the most part the industry has moved to C6, which has already been studied and shown is not toxic,” said Jessica Bowman, senior director for Global Fluoro-Chemistry for the American Chemistry Council.

https://www.firerescue1.com/cancer/articles/349394018-PPE-manufacturer-refutes-false-claims-about-turnout-gear-hazards/

LION president Stephen Schwartz said the elevated cancer risk “derives from the hazardous substances produced by the fire, not the turnout gear that protects firefighters”

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

No reply from EPA, CDC/ATSDR, or US Attorney General ever came. The funds Rob Bilott were seeking went to the CDC for the PFAS Study of military communities. Pease AFB was awarded the initial study by the hard work of Senator Jeanne Shaheen.

We would soon learn that the Pease AFB Concept Plan specifically excluded firefighters from the study. Due to ‘occupational exposure’. On September 12, 2018, Attorney Bilott would write a 47 page letter directly to Dr Breysse of ATSDR challenging his decision to exclude fire fighters, and stating his concerns for the lack of studies for this group of workers.

September 2018, Attorney Bilott is interviewed by NBC’s Karen Hensel about FF’s and PFAS:

https://www.nbcboston.com/investigations/Chemical-in-Firefighter-Turnout-Gear-Eyed-As-Potential-Cancer-Agent-494194661.html?fbclid=IwAR14Vc6hwLTz82hq5IBQjbsjFHJeGJ8u-qR6A4Ashsj2J3kWAPYQaxVc5gc

October 4, 2018 Attorney Bilott files a ‘nationwide class action suit’.

http://liblog.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Hardwick-v-3M-et-al-S.D.OhioE_.Div-no.18-01185-COMPLAINT-Thu4Oct2018.pdf

Plaintiff, Kevin D. Hardwick, by his undersigned attorneys, alleges upon information and belief, as follows:

NATURE OF THE ACTION  This is a national class action brought on behalf of Plaintiff individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, for injunctive, equitable, and declaratory relief, by Plaintiff and other class members for injuries arising from the intentional, knowing, reckless and/or negligent acts and/or omissions of Defendants in connection with contamination of the blood and/or bodies of Plaintiff and other class members with synthetic, toxic per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (collectively “PFAS”), including but not limited to perfluorooctanoic acid (“PFOA”) and perfluorooctane sulfonic acid (“PFOS”) and related chemicals, including but not limited to those that degrade to PFOA and/or PFOS, and including but not limited to C3-C-15 PFAS  chemicals, such as perfluorohexanesulfonate (PFHxS), perfluorononanoate (PFNA),    perfluorobutanesulfonate (PFBS), perfluorohexanoate (PFHxA), perfluoroheptanoate (PFHpA), perfluoroundecanoate (PFUnA), perfluorododecanoate (PFDoA), HFPA Dimer Acid (CAS # 13252-13-6/C3 Dimer Acid/P-08-508/FRD903/GX903/C3DA/GenX), and HFPA Dimer Acid Ammonium Salt (CAS# 62037-80-3/ammonium salt of C3 Dimer Acid/P-08- 509/FRD902/GX902/GenX), which resulted and continues to result from Defendants using Plaintiff and the other class members as part of a massive, undisclosed human health experiment without the knowledge and/or consent of Plaintiff or the other class members.

Plaintiff, Kevin D. Hardwick, is a citizen of the State of Ohio and a resident of the Southern District of Ohio, and has worked as a firefighter for more than forty years, during which he has used firefighting foams containing one of more PFAS materials, used equipment/gear treated and/or coated with materials containing and/or contaminated with one or more PFAS materials, and/or otherwise was exposed to one or more PFAS materials, and now has one or more PFAS materials in his blood serum.

Upon information and belief, Defendant, 3M Company (a/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company) (“3M”), is a Delaware corporation and does business throughout the United States, including conducting business in Ohio. 3M has its principal place of business in St. Paul, Minnesota.

Upon information and belief, 3M marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed released, trained users, produced instructional materials, sold and/or otherwise handled and/or used PFAS that are the subject of this Complaint, including in Ohio and this District, in such a way as to result in the contamination of Plaintiff’s and the other class members’ blood and/or bodies with PFAS, and the biopersistence and bioaccumulation of such PFAS in such blood and/or bodies.

Upon information and belief, Defendant, Dyneon, L.L.C. (“Dyneon”), is a Delaware corporation and does business throughout the United States, including conducting business in Ohio. Dyneon has its principal place of business in Oakdale, Minnesota.

Upon information and belief, Dyneon marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced instructional materials, sold, and/or otherwise handled and/or used PFAS that are the subject of this Complaint, including in Ohio and this District, in such a way as to result in the contamination of Plaintiff’s and the other class members’ blood and/or bodies with PFAS, and the biopersistence and bioaccumulation of such PFAS in such blood and/or bodies.

Upon information and belief, Defendant, E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (“DuPont”), is a Delaware corporation and does business throughout the United States, including conducting business in Ohio. DuPont has its principal place of business in Wilmington, Delaware.

Upon information and belief, DuPont marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced instructional materials, sold, and/or otherwise handled and/or used PFAS that are the subject of this Complaint, including in Ohio and this District, in such a way as to result in the contamination of Plaintiff’s and the other class members’ blood and/or bodies with PFAS, and the biopersistence and bioaccumulation of such PFAS in such blood and/or bodies.

Upon information and belief, Defendant, The Chemours Company, L.L.C. (“Chemours”), is a Delaware corporation and does business throughout the United States, including conducting business in Ohio. Chemours has its principal place of business in Wilmington, Delaware.

Upon information and belief, Chemours marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced instructional materials, sold, and/or otherwise handled and/or used PFAS that are the subject of this Complaint, including in Ohio and this District, in such a way as to result in the contamination of Plaintiff’s and the other class members’ blood and/or bodies with PFAS, and the biopersistence and bioaccumulation of such PFAS in such blood and/or bodies.

Upon information and belief, Defendant, Archroma Management, LLC (“Achroma”), is a corporation existing under the laws of the country of Switzerland and does business throughout the United States, including conducting business in Ohio. Archroma has its principal place of business in Reinach, Switzerland.

Upon information and belief, Archroma marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced instructional materials, sold, and/or otherwise handled and/or used PFAS that are the subject of this Complaint, including in Ohio and this District, in such a way as to result in the contamination of Plaintiff’s and the other class members’ blood and/or bodies with PFAS, and the biopersistence and bioaccumulation of such PFAS in such blood and/or bodies.

Upon information and belief, Defendant, Arkema, Inc., is a Pennsylvania corporation and does business throughout the United States, including conducting business in Ohio. Arkema Inc. has its principal place of business in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania.

Upon information and belief, Defendant Arkema, Inc., marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced instructional materials, sold, and/or otherwise handled and/or used PFAS that are the subject of this Complaint, including in Ohio and this District, in such a way as to result in the contamination of Plaintiff’s and the other class members’ blood and/or bodies with PFAS, and the biopersistence and bioaccumulation of such PFAS in such blood and/or bodies.

Defendant Arkema, Inc. is an operating subsidiary of Defendant Arkema France, S.A. Defendant Arkema France, S.A., is a publicly traded foreign corporation having its principal place of business in Colombes, France. Defendant Arkema France, S.A., is the parent corporation of Defendant Arkema, Inc.

Upon information and belief, Defendant Arkema France, S.A., marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced instructional materials, sold, and/or otherwise handled and/or used PFAS that are the subject of this Complaint, including in Ohio and this District, in such a way as to result in the contamination of Plaintiff’s and the other class members’ blood and/or bodies with PFAS, and the biopersistence and bioaccumulation of such PFAS in such blood and/or bodies.

Defendant Arkema France, S.A. and Defendant Arkema, Inc. are collectively referred to herein as “Arkema.”

Upon information and belief, Defendant, AGC, Inc. f/k/a Asahi Glass Co. Ltd. (“AGC”), is a corporation organized under the laws of Japan and does business throughout the United States, including conducting business in Ohio. Asahi has its principal place of business in Tokyo, Japan.

Upon information and belief, AGC marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced instructional materials, sold, and/or otherwise handled and/or used PFAS that are the subject of this Complaint, including in Ohio and this District, in such a way as to result in the contamination of Plaintiff’s and the other class members’ blood and/or bodies with PFAS, and the biopersistence and bioaccumulation of such PFAS in such blood and/or bodies.

Upon information and belief, Defendant, Daikin Industries, Ltd., is a corporation existing under the laws of Japan and does business throughout the United States, including conducting business in Ohio. Defendant Daikin Industries, Ltd., has its principal place of business in Osaka, Japan.

Upon information and belief, Defendant Daikin Industries, Ltd., marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced instructional materials, sold, and/or otherwise handled and/or used PFAS that are the subject of this Complaint, including in Ohio and this District, in such a way as to result in the contamination of Plaintiff’s and the other class members’ blood and/or bodies with PFAS, and the biopersistence and bioaccumulation of such PFAS in such blood and/or bodies.

Upon information and belief, Defendant, Daikin America, Inc., is a corporation existing under the laws of Delaware and does business throughout the United States, including conducting business in Ohio.

Daikin America, Inc. has its principal place of business in Orangeburg, New York.

Upon information and belief, Daikin America, Inc. marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced instructional materials, sold, and/or otherwise handled and/or used PFAS that are the subject of this Complaint, including in Ohio and this District, in such a way as to result in the contamination of Plaintiff’s and the other class members’ blood and/or bodies with PFAS, and the biopersistence and bioaccumulation of such PFAS in such blood and/or bodies.

Defendant Daikin Industries, Ltd. and Defendant Daikin America, Inc. are collectively referred to herein as “Daikin.”

Upon information and belief, Defendant, Solvay Specialty Polymers, USA, LLC (“Solvay”), is a Delaware corporation and does business throughout the United States, including conducting business in Ohio. Solvay has its principal place of business in Alpharetta, Georgia.

Upon information and belief, Solvay marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced instructional materials, sold, and/or otherwise handled and/or used PFAS that are the subject of this Complaint, including in Ohio and this District, in such a way as to result in the contamination of Plaintiff’s and the other class members’ blood and/or bodies with PFAS, and the biopersistence and bioaccumulation of such PFAS in such blood and/or bodies

IV. GENERAL FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

PFAS materials are a class of non-naturally-occurring, man-made chemicals that were first developed in the late 1930s to 1940s and put into large-scale manufacture and use by the early 1950s.

Defendants have each marketed, developed, distributed, sold, manufactured, released, trained users on, produced instructional materials for, and/or otherwise handled and/or used one or more PFAS materials, including in Ohio and this District, in such a way as to cause the contamination of Plaintiff’s and the class members’ blood and/or bodies with PFAS, and the resultant biopersistence and bioaccumulation of such PFAS in the blood and/or bodies of Plaintiff and other class members.

Prior to commercial development and large-scale manufacture and use of PFAS materials, no such PFAS materials had been found, detected, or were present in human blood.

By at least the end of the 1960s, animal toxicity testing performed by Defendants manufacturing and/or using PFAS materials indicated that exposure to such materials, including at least PFOA, resulted in various adverse health effects among multiple species of laboratory animals, including toxic effects to the liver, testes, adrenals, and other organs and bodily systems

By at least the end of the 1960s, additional research and testing performed by Defendants manufacturing and/or using PFAS materials indicated that such materials, including at least PFOA, because of their unique chemical structure, were resistant to environmental degradation and would persist in the environment essentially unaltered if allowed to enter the environment.

By at least the end of the 1970s, additional research and testing performed by Defendants manufacturing and/or using PFAS materials indicated that one or more such materials, including at least PFOA and PFOS, because of their unique chemical structure, would bind to proteins in the blood of animals and humans exposed to such materials where such materials would not only remain and persist over long periods of time but would accumulate and build up in the blood/body of the exposed individuals with each additional exposure, no matter how small.

Defendants manufacturing and/or using PFAS materials released such PFAS materials into the environment during, as a result of, or in connection with their manufacturing and other commercial operations, including into the air, surface waters, ground water, soils, landfills, and/or through their involvement and/or participation in the creation of consumer or other commercial products and materials and related training and instructional materials and activities, including in Ohio and this District, that Defendants knew, foresaw, and/or reasonably should have known and/or foreseen would expose Plaintiff and the other class members to such PFAS.

By at least the end of the 1970s, Defendants manufacturing and/or using PFAS materials, including at least DuPont and 3M, were aware that PFAS materials, including at least PFOA and PFOS, had been detected not only in the blood of workers at PFAS manufacturing facilities, but in the blood of the general population of the United States in people not known to be working at or living near PFAS manufacturing and/or use facilities, indicating to such Defendants that continued manufacture and use of such PFAS materials would inevitably result in continued and increased levels of PFAS getting into the environment and into human blood across the United States, even in areas nowhere near or associated with specific PFAS manufacturing or use facilities.

By at least the end of the 1980s, additional research and testing performed by Defendants manufacturing and/or using PFAS materials indicated that at least one such PFAS material, PFOA, had caused Leydig cell (testicular) tumors in a chronic cancer study in rats, resulting in at least one such Defendant, DuPont, classifying such PFAS material internally as a confirmed animal carcinogen and possible human carcinogen.

It was understood by Defendants by at least the end of the 1980s that a chemical that caused cancer in animal studies must be presumed to present a cancer risk to humans, unless the precise mechanism of action by which the tumors were caused was known and it was known that such mechanism of action would not be operative and/or occur in humans.

By at least the end of the 1980s, scientists had not determined the precise mechanism of action by which any PFAS material caused tumors and thus prevailing scientific principles of carcinogenesis classification mandated that Defendants presume any such PFAS material that caused tumors in animal studies could present a potential cancer risk to exposed humans.

By at least the end of the 1980s, additional research and testing performed by Defendants manufacturing and/or using PFAS materials, including at least DuPont, indicated that elevated incidence of certain cancers and other adverse health effects, including elevated liver enzymes and birth defects, had been observed among workers exposed to such materials, including at least PFOA, but such data was not published, provided to governmental entities as required by law, or otherwise publicly disclosed at the time.

By at least the end of the 1980s, Defendants, including at least 3M and DuPont, understood that, not only did these PFAS materials, including at least PFOA and PFOS, get into and persist and accumulate in human blood and in the human body, but that once in the human body and blood, particularly the longer-chain PFAS materials, such as PFOS and PFOA, had a long half-life, meaning that they would take a very long time (years) before even half of the material would start to be eliminated (assuming no further exposures), which allowed increasing levels of the chemicals to build up and accumulate in the blood and/or body of exposed individuals over time, particularly if any level of exposures continued.

B y at least the end of the 1990s, additional research and testing performed by Defendants manufacturing and/or using PFAS materials, including at least 3M and DuPont, indicated that at least one such PFAS material, PFOA, had caused a triad of tumors (Leydig cell (testicular), liver, and pancreatic) in a second chronic cancer study in rats.

By at least the end of the 1990s, the precise mechanism(s) of action by which any PFAS material caused each of the tumors found in animal studies had still not been identified, mandating that Defendants continue to presume that any such PFAS material that caused such tumors in animal studies could present a potential cancer risk to exposed humans.

By at least 2010, additional research and testing performed by Defendants manufacturing and/or using PFAS materials, including at least 3M and DuPont, revealed multiple potential adverse health impacts among workers exposed to such PFAS materials, including at least PFOA, such as increased cancer incidence, hormone changes, lipid changes, and thyroid and liver impacts, which such Defendants’ own scientists, lawyers, and advisors recommended be studied further to assess the extent to which PFAS exposures were causing those effects.

When the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“USEPA”) and other state and local public health agencies and officials first began learning of PFAS exposures in the United States and potential associated adverse health effects, Defendants repeatedly assured and represented to such entities and the public that such exposures presented no risk of harm and were of no legal, toxicological, or medical significance of any kind.

After USEPA and other entities began asking Defendants to stop manufacturing and/or using certain PFAS materials, Defendants began manufacturing and/or using and/or began making and/or using more of certain other and/or “new” PFAS materials, including PFAS materials with six or fewer carbons, such as GenX (collectively “Short-Chain PFAS”).

Defendants manufacturing and/or using Short-Chain PFAS, including at least DuPont and 3M, are aware that one or more such Short-Chain PFAS materials also have been found in human blood.

By at least the mid-2010s, Defendants, including at least DuPont and Chemours, were aware that at least one Short-Chain PFAS had been found to cause the same triad of tumors (Leydig (testicular), liver, and pancreatic) in a chronic rat cancer study as had been found in a chronic rat cancer study with a non-Short-Chain PFAS.

As of today’s date, the precise mechanism(s) of action by which any PFAS causes each of the tumors found in animal studies has(ve) not been identified, mandating that Defendants presume that any such PFAS material that caused such tumors in animal studies be presumed to present a potential cancer risk to exposed humans.

Research and testing performed by and/or on behalf of Defendants making and/or using Short-Chain PFAS indicates that such Short-Chain PFAS materials present the same, similar, and/or additional risks to human health as had been found in research on other PFAS materials, including cancer risk.

Nevertheless, Defendants repeatedly assured and represented to governmental entities and the public (and continue to do so) that the presence of PFAS materials, including these Short-Chain PFAS materials, in human blood at the levels found within the United States presents no risk of harm and is of no legal, toxicological, or medical significance of any kind.

As of today’s date, Archroma, Arkema France, AGC, Chemours, Daikin Industries, Ltd., and Solvay, through their membership in the FluoroCouncil, represent to the public through the FluoroCouncil website that: “The newer, short-chain chemistries currently in use are well studied [and] … [t]he science supports the conclusion that the newer FluoroTechnology is not expected to present a significant risk to humans and the environment.”

At all relevant times, Defendants, individually and/or collectively, have had the resources and ability but have intentionally, purposefully, recklessly, and/or negligently chosen not to fund or sponsor any study, investigation, testing, and/or other research of any kind of the nature Defendants claim is necessary to confirm and/or prove that the presence of any one and/or combination of PFAS in human blood causes any disease and/or adverse health impact of any kind in humans, presents any risk of harm to humans, and/or is of any legal, toxicological, or medical significance to humans, according to standards Defendants deem acceptable.

Even after an independent science panel, known as the “C8 Science Panel,” publicly announced in the 2010s that human exposure to 0.05 parts per billion or more of one PFAS, PFOA, in drinking water for one year or more had “probable links” with certain human diseases, including kidney cancer, testicular cancer, ulcerative colitis, thyroid disease, preeclampsia, and medically-diagnosed high cholesterol, Defendants repeatedly assured and represented to governmental entities, their customers, and the public (and continue to do so) that the presence of PFAS in human blood at the levels found within the United States presents no risk of harm and is of no legal, toxicological, or medical significance of any kind, and have represented to and assured such governmental entities, their customers, and the public (and continue to do so) that the work of the independent C8 Science Panel was inadequate to satisfy the standards of Defendants to prove such adverse effects upon and/or any risk to humans with respect to PFAS in human blood.

At all relevant times, Defendants shared and/or should have shared among themselves all relevant information relating to the presence, biopersistence, and bioaccumulation of PFAS in human blood and associated toxicological, epidemiological, and/or other adverse effects and/or risks.

As of the present date, blood serum testing and analysis by Defendants, independent scientific researchers, and/or government entities has confirmed that PFAS materials are clinically demonstrably present in approximately 99% of the current population of the United States.

There is no naturally-occurring “background,” normal, and/or acceptable level or rate of any PFAS in human blood, as all PFAS detected and/or present in human blood is present and/or detectable in such blood as a direct and proximate result of the acts and/or omissions of Defendants.

Data exists to indicate that the presence, accumulation, toxic invasion, and/or persistence of PFAS in human blood, including that of Plaintiff and the other class members, is injurious and physically harmful and results in unwanted, unconsented-to, and deleterious alterations, changes, and/or other presently-existing physical injury and/or adverse impacts to the blood and/or bodies of Plaintiff and the other class members, including but not limited to subcellular injuries, including but not limited to biopersistence and bioaccumulation within the body.

At all relevant times, Defendants, through their acts and/or omissions, controlled, minimized, trivialized, manipulated, and/or otherwise influenced the information that was published in peer-review journals, released by any governmental entity, and/or otherwise made available to the public relating to PFAS materials in human blood and any alleged adverse impacts and/or risks associated therewith, effectively preventing Plaintiff or the class members from discovering the existence and extent of any injuries/harm as alleged herein.

At all relevant times, Defendants, through their acts and/or omissions, took steps to attack, challenge, discredit, and/or otherwise undermine any scientific studies, findings, statements, and/or other information that proposed, alleged, suggested, or even implied any potential adverse health effects or risks and/or any other fact of any legal, toxicological, or medical significance associated with the presence of PFAS in human blood.

At all relevant times, Defendants, through their acts and/or omissions, concealed and/or withheld information from their customers, governmental entities, and the public that would have properly and fully alerted Plaintiff or the class members to the legal, toxicological, medical, or other significance and/or risk from having any PFAS material in their blood.

At all relevant times, Defendants encouraged the continued and even further increased use and release into the environment of PFAS, including into Ohio and this District, by their customers and others, including but not limited to through manufacture, use, and release, of aqueous fire-fighting foams containing or made with PFAS and/or emergency responder protection gear or equipment coated with materials made with or containing PFAS, and tried to encourage and foster the increased and further use of PFAS, including in Ohio and this District, in connection with as many products/uses/and applications as possible, despite knowledge of the toxicity, persistence, and bioaccumulation concerns associated with such activities.

Once governmental entities and regulators began learning of the potential toxicity, persistence, and bioaccumulation concerns associated with PFAS, Defendants cited to the pervasive use of such PFAS throughout numerous sectors of the American economy (which they had intentionally and purposefully encouraged and created) and the widespread presence of PFAS in blood of Americans (which they also had negligently, recklessly, and/or intentionally caused) as an excuse and/or reason not to restrict or regulate PFAS, essentially arguing that the issues associated with PFAS had become “too big to regulate.”

To this day, Defendants deny that the presence of any PFAS in Plaintiff’s or any class member’s blood, at any level, is an injury or presents any harm or risk of harm of any kind, or is otherwise of any legal, toxicological, or medical significance.

To this day, Defendants deny that any scientific study, research, testing, or other work of any kind has been performed that is sufficient to suggest to Plaintiff or any class member that the presence of any PFAS material in their blood, at any level, is of any legal, toxicological, medical, or other significance.

Defendants, to this day, affirmatively assert and represent to governmental entities, their customers, and the public that there is no evidence that any of the PFAS found in human blood across the United States causes any health impacts or is sufficient to generate an increased risk of future disease sufficient to warrant diagnostic medical testing, often referring to existing studies or data as including too few participants or too few cases or incidents of disease to draw any scientifically credible or statistically significant conclusions.

Defendants, to this day, use and rely upon what they claim is this same “lack of definitive evidence of causation” as between any PFAS and any adverse human health effect to oppose and try to discourage regulatory and/or legislative efforts to limit, restrict, and/or address PFAS impacts to the environment or human health, and to oppose, reject, and deny claims that PFAS has caused any injury or increased the risk of any adverse human health effects.

Yet, to this day, Defendants knowingly, willfully, purposefully, intentionally, recklessly, and/or negligently refuse to fund or conduct any scientific study, research, testing, and/or other work of any kind that is extensive or comprehensive enough, according to Defendants, to generate results that Defendants will accept (outside the context of an existing written settlement agreement such as DuPont entered with respect to certain PFOA exposures, which created the C8 Science Panel) as sufficient to confirm a causal connection between any single or combination of PFAS in human blood and any injury, human disease, adverse human health impact, and/or a risk sufficient to warrant any personal injury compensation or future diagnostic medical testing, including medical monitoring (hereinafter “Sufficient Results”).

Instead, Defendants claim that they should be permitted to wait to see if and when Plaintiff or any class member dies, develops any serious disease, adverse health effect, or risk of a nature necessitating diagnostic testing demonstrated through data Defendants believe constitutes Sufficient Results, even if that means watching, monitoring, or analyzing what happens to Plaintiff and/or class members based on PFAS in their blood over many years or even decades.

Thus, rather than fund and perform the work necessary to prove through Sufficient Results the precise nature and extent of potential adverse effects and/or risks from having PFAS in human blood before such PFAS materials were caused, allowed, and/or permitted by Defendants, through their acts and/or omissions, to contaminate the blood and/or bodies of Plaintiff and the other class members, Defendants have used and/or continue to use Plaintiff and the other class members as human guinea pigs in a decades-long experiment through which Defendants knowingly, recklessly, and /or negligently cause, allow, and/or permit Plaintiff and the other class members to be contaminated with PFAS materials, allow such PFAS to persist and accumulate in their blood and/or bodies, and then watch, record, study, assess, and/or monitor what happens to Plaintiff and the class members over time as a result of the contamination, biopersistence, and bioaccumulation of PFAS, while arguing that Plaintiff and the other class members have no rights to stop or address these PFAS exposures until and unless they can prove, at their cost, that such exposures have caused them a serious disease or killed them outright.

Plaintiff and the other class members were not told that their blood and/or bodies were being contaminated with PFAS, nor did they consent to either such exposure or being part of any study, experiment, and/or other activity by and/or on behalf of any Defendant that purported to associate, monitor, and/or evaluate whether any of their health conditions were related to any PFAS or combination of PFAS.

Defendants were and/or should have been aware, knew and/or should have known, and/or foresaw or should have foreseen that their marketing, development, manufacture, distribution, release, training of users, production of instructional materials, sale and/or other handling and/or use of PFAS materials, including in Ohio and this District, would result in the contamination of the blood and/or bodies of Plaintiff and the other class members with PFAS materials, and the biopersistence and bioaccumulation of such PFAS in such blood and/or bodies.

Defendants were and /or should have been aware, or knew and/or should have known, and/or foresaw or should have foreseen that allowing PFAS materials to contaminate the blood and/or bodies of Plaintiff and the other class members would cause injury, irreparable harm, and/or unacceptable risk of such injury and/or irreparable harm to Plaintiff and the other class members.

Defendants were and/or should have been aware, knew and/or should have known, an/or foresaw or should have foreseen that Sufficient Results did not, according to Defendants, exist before Defendants caused, allowed, and/or permitted PFAS materials to contaminate the blood and/or bodies of Plaintiff and the other class members.

Defendants did not seek or obtain permission or consent from Plaintiff or the other class members before engaging in such acts and/or omissions that caused, allowed, and/or otherwise resulted in the contamination of Plaintiff’s and the other class members’ blood and/or bodies with PFAS materials, and resulting biopersistence and bioaccumulation of such PFAS in such blood and/or bodies.

Defendants did not seek or obtain permission or consent from Plaintiff or the other class members before using any data relating to them in whatever studies, research, investigations, testing, and/or other work upon which Defendants rely to support their claims and/or representations that the PFAS in Plaintiff’s or the other class members’ blood is insufficient to cause and/or increase the risk of any injury, adverse health effects, and/or any other effects of any legal, toxicological, medical or other significance.

Plaintiff and the other class members are reasonably concerned and fearful of the effects of having PFAS in their blood, including the synergistic effects of having multiple PFAS materials in their blood at the same time, and what such effects will and/or are reasonably likely and/or probable to do to them and/or their children, including reasonable fear of cancer and/or other serious disease that may have long latency periods after such exposures.

Plaintiff and the other class members should not have to wait until actual diseases, death, or other adverse effects occur as a result of the PFAS in their blood and/or bodies before adequate testing and/or research is funded and/or performed to generate Sufficient Results upon which Plaintiff and other class members can rely.

Plaintiff and the other class members should not have to bear the burden of funding and/or performing such testing and/or research to generate Sufficient Results, which is likely to cost more than $5 Million, when Plaintiff and the other class members are not the ones who put the PFAS in their blood and/or bodies, they did not consent or provide any permission to Defendants to do so (or were they even aware they were being contaminated with such PFAS materials), and Defendants have collectively reaped billions of dollars in profits from the acts and/or omissions that caused, permitted, allowed, and/or otherwise resulted in the PFAS contamination of Plaintiff’s and the other class members’ blood and/or bodies and resultant biopersistence and bioaccumulation of such PFAS in such blood and/or bodies.

Defendants are relying upon and citing the purported lack of Sufficient Results to reject, oppose, and/or deny any claims by Plaintiff and/or the class members that they have suffered any injury or are entitled to any damages, monitoring, or other relief because of any such injury.

Defendants have more than sufficient collective assets and resources to fund a completely independent scientific process, similar to that funded by DuPont and conducted by the C8 Science Panel with respect to PFOA drinking water exposures, that all persons, including Defendants, governmental and regulatory entities, Plaintiff, class members, the scientific community and the public, can rely upon to provide Sufficient Results with respect to PFAS materials in Plaintiff’s and other class members’ blood and/or bodies, including any synergistic effects of such PFAS materials.

V. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff brings this lawsuit as a class action on behalf of the following nationwide class, as set forth below:

All individuals residing within the United States who, at the time a class is certified in this case, have a detectable level of PFAS materials in their blood serum (the “Class”).

Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the class definition set forth above if discovery and/or further investigation reveals that the Class should be expanded, divided into subclasses, or modified in any way.

The definition of the Class is unambiguous. Plaintiff is a member of the Class that he seeks to represent.

Class members are so numerous that individual joinder is impracticable. The precise number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff, but it is clear the number greatly exceeds the number to make joinder possible, particularly given the widespread nature of PFAS contamination of human blood samples collected from throughout the United States on multiple occasions.

The resolution of the claims of class members in a single action will provide substantial benefits to all parties and the Court.

Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of all the members of the proposed Class; like all proposed class members, Plaintiff has detectable levels of one or more PFAS in his blood serum.

Moreover, the factual bases of Defendants’ acts and/or omissions are common to all members of the proposed Class.

Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the proposed Class.

Plaintiff has retained counsel with substantial experience litigating environmental torts, and specifically environmental torts involving PFAS, as well as class actions.

Common questions of law and fact predominate over the questions affecting only individual Class members. Some of the common legal and factual questions include:

a. Whether Defendants owed a duty to Plaintiff and members of the Class to refrain from acts and/or omissions reasonably likely to result in PFAS in the blood of Plaintiff and the members of the Class, and the biopersistence and bioaccumulation of such PFAS in such serum;

b. Whether Defendants knew, foresaw, anticipated and/or should have known, anticipated, and/or foreseen that it was unreasonably dangerous to engage in acts and/or omissions that resulted in the presence, persistence, and accumulation of PFAS in the blood and/or bodies of humans;

c. Whether Defendants knew, anticipated, foresaw, and/or should have known, anticipated, and/or foresaw that their acts and/or omissions were likely to result in Plaintiff and the class members having persistent and accumulating PFAS in their blood and/or bodies;

d. Whether Defendants’ acts and/or omissions proximately caused PFAS to contaminate, persist in, and accumulate in the blood and/or bodies of Plaintiff and the class members;

e. Whether the presence, persistence, and accumulation of PFAS in Plaintiff’s and the class members’ blood and/or bodies and any resultant subcellular or other impact and/or effect, is injurious, offensive, and/or otherwise harmful to Plaintiff and the class members; and

f. Whether Defendants’ conduct is resulting in irreparable harm to Plaintiff and the class members; and

g. Whether Defendants’ conduct warrants injunctive and/or declaratory relief

Plaintiff and members of the Class all have PFAS in their serum bloodstream. A class action is superior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy.

Absent a class action, most class members would likely find the cost of litigating their claims to be prohibitively high and, therefore, would have no effective remedy at law.

Class treatment of common questions of law and fact will conserve the resources of the courts and the litigants and will promote consistency and efficiency of adjudication.

Whether or not Plaintiff proves which particular Defendant produced the PFAS that contaminated, infiltrated, persists in, and/or accumulated in Plaintiff’s and other members of the class’ blood and/or bodies, Defendants will be liable to Plaintiff and the class members, based on theories of alternative liability and/or market share liability, because they marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced instructional materials, sold, and/or otherwise handled and/or used the PFASs that are the subject of this Complaint, including in Ohio and this District, in such a way as to result in the contamination of Plaintiff’s and the other class members’ blood and/or bodies with PFAS, and the biopersistence and bioaccumulation of such PFAS in such blood and/or bodies.

VI. CAUSES OF ACTION

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF (Negligence)

Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if restated in full herein.

Defendants had a duty to exercise reasonable care in their design, engineering, manufacture, development, fabrication, testing, release, training of users, production of informational materials, handling, selling, use, and/or distribution of PFAS, including a duty of care to ensure that PFAS did not infiltrate, persist in, and accumulate in the blood and/or bodies of Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class.

Defendants owed a duty of care towards Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class that was commensurate with the inherently dangerous, harmful, injurious, bio-persistent, environmentally-persistent, toxic, and bio-accumulative nature of PFAS.

Defendants failed to exercise ordinary care by acts and/or omissions that permitted, allowed, and/or otherwise resulted in the contamination of, persistence in, and accumulation in the blood and/or bodies of Plaintiff and the other class members with one or more PFAS materials, including all such acts and/or omissions referenced in this Complaint, resulting in Plaintiff and the other members of the proposed Class having one or more PFAS materials in their blood.

Defendants knew, foresaw, anticipated, and/or should have foreseen, anticipated, and/or known that the design, engineering, manufacture, fabrication, sale, release, training of users, production of informational materials, handling, use, and/or distribution of PFAS and/or other acts and/or omissions as described in this Complaint could likely result in the contamination of the blood and/or bodies of Plaintiff and the proposed class members and its persistence and accumulation in such blood and/or bodies.

Despite knowing, anticipating, and/or foreseeing the bio-persistent, bioaccumulative, toxic, and/or otherwise harmful and/or injurious nature of PFAS materials, Defendants, their agents, servants, and/or employees, committed negligent acts and/or omissions that resulted in the contamination of the blood and/or bodies of Plaintiff and the other class members with one or more PFAS materials, and the biopersistence and bioaccumulation of such PFAS in such blood and/or bodies.

Defendants, through their acts and/or omissions as described in this Complaint, breached their duty to Plaintiff and the members of the proposed Class.

It was reasonably foreseeable to Defendants that Plaintiff, and the members of the proposed Class, would likely suffer the injuries and harm described in this Complaint by virtue of Defendants’ breach of their duty and failure to exercise ordinary care, as described herein.

But for Defendants’ negligent acts and/or omissions, Plaintiff and members of the proposed class would not have been injured or harmed.

Defendants’ negligent conduct was the direct and proximate cause of the injuries and harm to Plaintiff and the proposed class members, as described herein.

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF (Battery)

Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if restated in full herein.

At all relevant times, Defendants possessed knowledge that the PFAS which they designed, engineered, manufactured, fabricated, sold, handled, released, trained users on, produced instructional materials for, used, and/or distributed were bio-persistent, bioaccumulative, toxic, potentially carcinogenic, and/or otherwise harmful/injurious and that their continued manufacture, use, sale, handling, release, and distribution would result in Plaintiff and the other members of the proposed Class having PFAS in their blood, and the biopersistence and bioaccumulation of such PFAS in such blood.

However, despite possessing such knowledge, Defendants knowingly, purposefully, and/or intentionally continued to engage in such acts and/or omissions, including but not limited to all such acts and/or omissions described in this Complaint, that continued to result in Plaintiff and the other proposed class members accumulating PFAS in their blood and/or bodies, and such PFAS persisting and accumulating in such blood and/or bodies.

Defendants did not seek or obtain permission or consent from Plaintiff or members of the class to put or allow PFAS materials into their blood and/or bodies, or to persist in and/or accumulate in their blood and/or bodies.

Entry into, persistence in, and accumulation of such PFAS in Plaintiff’s and the other class members’ bodies and/or blood without permission or consent is an unlawful and harmful and/or offensive physical invasion and/or contact with Plaintiff’s and the other class members’ persons and unreasonably interferes with Plaintiff’s rightful use and possession of Plaintiff’s and the other Class members’ blood and/or body.

At all relevant times, the PFAS present in the blood of Plaintiff and the other class members originated from Defendants’ acts and/or omissions.

Defendants continue to knowingly, intentionally, and/or purposefully engage in acts and/or omissions that result in the unlawful and unconsented-to physical invasion and/or contact with Plaintiff and the other class members that results in persisting and accumulating levels of PFAS in their blood.

Plaintiff, the class members and any reasonable person find the contact at issue harmful and/or offensive.

Defendants acted intentionally with the knowledge and/or belief that the contact, presence and/or invasion of PFAS with, onto and/or into Plaintiff’s blood serum, including its persistence and accumulation in such serum, was substantially certain to result from those very acts and/or omissions.

Defendants’ intentional acts and/or omissions resulted directly and/or indirectly in harmful contact with Plaintiff’s and the class members’ blood and/or body.

The continued presence, persistence, and accumulation of PFAS in the blood and/or body of Plaintiff and the other class members is offensive, unreasonable, and/or harmful, and thereby constitutes a battery.

The presence of PFAS in the blood and/or body of Plaintiff and the other class members has altered the structure and/or function of such blood and/or body parts.

As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing acts and omissions, Plaintiff and the other class members suffered and/or continue to suffer physical injury for which Defendants are therefore liable.

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF (Declaratory Judgment under the Declaratory Judgment Act)  Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if restated in full herein.  An actual, substantial, and justiciable controversy has arisen and exists between Plaintiff and members of the class and Defendants herein and their respective rights, obligations, and duties with respect to Defendants’ contamination of the blood and/or bodies of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class with PFAS, and the biopersistence and bioaccumulation of such PFAS in such blood and/or bodies.  By reason of the foregoing, Plaintiff and the other class members seek a declaratory judgment against Defendants that Defendants are liable and responsible for the PFAS in Plaintiff’s and the class members’ blood and/or bodies and all equitable and/or injunctive relief, and such other relief as the Court may Order, that the Court deems reasonable and appropriate in relation thereto.  Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if restated in full herein.  Defendants maliciously conspired among each other and with consulting firms, agents, representatives, and others and/or through forming joint task forces, committees, coalitions, trade groups, and/or councils and/or otherwise colluding through unlawful, affirmative misrepresentations and/or unlawful concealment of material facts regarding PFAS, including but not limited to each such act and/or omission described in this Complaint, to illegally and/or wrongfully create and perpetuate a market for PFAS, increase exposures to PFAS, produce profits for PFAS, conceal, misrepresent, and/or mislead as to the dangers and toxicity associated with PFAS and/or conduct other operations and activities in a manner as to illegally and/or wrongfully cause, permit, and/or allow PFAS to contaminate the blood and/or bodies of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class with PFAS, by illegally and/or wrongfully using, creating, and/or collecting data related to PFAS exposure among Plaintiff and/or other members of the Class in experiments, studies, research, and/or other scientific inquires without the consent, knowledge, permission, and/or awareness, of Plaintiff and/or such other members of the Class, and also by illegally and/or wrongfully avoiding properly notifying the public or government officials of the ongoing release and continuing exposure of PFAS into the environment, and illegally and/or wrongfully avoiding correcting, clarifying, rescinding, and/or qualifying their misrepresentations to Plaintiff and other members of the Class regarding PFAS and that Defendants acts and/or omissions were not causing any physical harm, injury of any kind, and/or damage to them.  The purpose and result of Defendants’ and their co-conspirators’ conspiracy was to wrongfully and/or unlawfully hide Defendants’ illegal and unlawful acts and/or omissions that resulted in the contamination of the blood and/or bodies of Plaintiff and the other members of the class, to improperly minimize, trivialize, and/or misrepresent the actual harm and/or risks of PFAS exposures, to wrongfully and/or unlawfully deceive Plaintiff, and other members of the Class, into believing that PFAS was safe and/or to avoid lost profits and other economic harm to Defendants. Defendants’ and their co-conspirators’ conspiracy and the wrongful and/or unlawful acts in furtherance of their conspiracy directly and proximately induced justified reliance by Plaintiff, and other members of the Class, which directly and proximately caused the contamination of the blood and/or bodies of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class with PFAS. At the time Defendants and their co-conspirators made their misrepresentations, they knew of the health hazards and/or other risks posed by PFAS to Plaintiff and other members of the Class. There was great likelihood and/or certainty that serious harm would arise from Defendants’ and their co-conspirators’ misconduct, Defendants were aware of the likelihood of such harm, Defendants made profits from their and their co-conspirators’ misconduct, and Defendants made no effort to disclose and/or remedy their PFAS pollution after discovery of their and their co-conspirators’ misconduct.

VII. RELIEF SOUGHT BY THE CLASS

Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if restated in full herein.

Plaintiff and the proposed Class have sustained and will continue to sustain presently existing physical injury and/or irreparable harm in the form of PFAS being present, accumulating, and/or persisting in their blood, as a result of Defendants’ acts and/or omissions.

As a result, Plaintiff and the Class seek equitable and/or injunctive relief for each of the causes of action alleged herein; neither Plaintiff nor the Class are seeking any compensatory damages for personal injuries through any class-wide claims asserted herein.

In particular, Plaintiff and the proposed Class seek the establishment of an independent panel of scientists, including but not limited to epidemiologists, toxicologists, medical doctors, and/or exposure-risk assessors, to be jointly selected by the parties (the “PFAS Science Panel”) and tasked with independently studying, evaluating, reviewing, identifying, publishing, and notifying/informing the Class of Sufficient Results that shall be deemed definitive and binding on all the parties, which work, including but not limited to any testing, sampling, or monitoring deemed appropriate by the PFAS Science Panel, (hereinafter “PFAS Science Panel Work”) shall all be funded by Defendants .

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, requests the Court to enter judgment against the Defendants, as follows:

(a) an order certifying the proposed Class, designating Plaintiff as the named representative of the proposed Class, and designating undersigned counsel as Class Counsel; and

(b) an order finding Defendants liable for negligence in the manner described herein;

© an order finding Defendants liable for battery in the manner described herein;

(d) an order finding Defendants liable for conspiracy in the manner described herein;

(e) a declaratory judgment declaring and finding Defendants liable for the injuries and injunctive relief described herein;

(f) equitable relief and/or an injunction ordering Defendants to provide for and fund the PFAS Science Panel Work described herein;

(g) an award of attorneys’ fees and costs, as permitted by law;

(h) an award of pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, as provided by law;

(i) leave to amend this Complaint to conform to the evidence produced at trial; and

(j) such other relief as may be appropriate under the circumstances and/or permitted by law and/or equity, or as the Court deems just and proper.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff hereby demands trial by jury as to all issues.

Dated: October 4, 2018 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ David J. Butler David J. Butler (0068455) Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP 65 East State Street, Suite 1000 Columbus, OH 43215–4213 Ph: (614) 221–2838 Fax: (614) 221–2007 Email: dbutler@taftlaw.com Case: 2:18-cv-01185-EAS-EPD Doc #: 1 Filed: 10/04/18 Page: 32 of 33 PAGEID #: 32 33 23663727.1

Robert A. Bilott Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP 425 Walnut Street, Suite 1800 Cincinnati, OH 45202–3957 Ph: (513) 381–2838 Fax: (513) 381–0205 Email: bilott@taftlaw.com

-and

Ned McWilliams (pro hac vice application forthcoming) Levin Papantonio Thomas Mitchell Rafferty & Proctor P.A. 316 South Baylen Street Pensacola, FL 32502 Ph: (850) 435–7138 Email: nmcwilliams@levinlaw.com Attorneys for Plaintiff